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REAGAN'S JUDICIAL APPOINTEES AND
ANTITRUST IN THE 1990s
by
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC*
INTRODUCTION
W LLIAM Baxter and James C. Miller III were well-suited to lead a
retrenchment of federal antitrust policy when Ronald Reagan ap-
pointed them to head the government's enforcement agencies in 1981.1
They were respected scholars with considerable intellectual capital in the
field of regulation, they were experienced observers of the policymaking
process, and they held a clear vision of the antitrust landscape they
wished to leave their successors.' The Reagan Administration's success
in redirecting federal antitrust enforcement policy is substantially attrib-
utable to their efforts.'
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. This paper is
based in part on a working paper titled "The Reagan Judiciary Examined: A Compari-
son of Antitrust Voting Records of Carter and Reagan Appointees to the Federal Courts
of Appeals" (Washington Legal Foundation, Working Paper No. 34: April 1989). An
earlier version of the paper was presented at the Cato Institute Conference on "A Cen-
tury of Antitrust: The Lessons, the Challenges," Washington, D.C., April 12, 1990. The
author thanks the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation for
support in the preparation of this paper. The author also is grateful to Barry Adler,
Kathryn Fenton, James Gattuso, Michael Greve, Richard Higgins, Michael McDonald,
Shannon O'Chester, Alan Slobodin, and Lawrence White for many useful comments,
discussions, and suggestions, and to Sean Coleman and Steven Taylor for their research
assistance.
1. Baxter served as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from 1981 to 1984, and
Miller chaired the Federal Trade Commission from 1981 to 1985.
2. Among other achievements, Miller had played a major role in laying the intellec-
tual foundation for the deregulation of interstate passenger airline service. See G. Doug-
las & J. Miller III, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport: Theory and Policy
(1974). Baxter had gained recognition as one of the nation's leading antitrust scholars,
both for his technical analysis and his understanding of the institutional processes that
influence the scope and quantity of antitrust enforcement. See The Political Economy of
Antitrust: Principal Paper by William Baxter (R. Tollison ed. 1980); Baxter, Legal Re-
strictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale LJ. 267
(1966).
3. See Gelihorn, James, Pogue & Sims, Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement?
A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 Antitrust Bull. 695, 707-09 (1990) [hereinafter "Gell-
horn"]; see also Elzinga, Decision Makers Do Matter, in Economic Liberties and the Judi-
ciary 302-03 (J. Dor & H. Manne eds. 1987) (discussing influence of William Baxter and
James Miller on federal antitrust enforcement). For discussions of the rightward shift in
federal antitrust policy during the Reagan administration, see Langenfeld & Walton, Reg-
ulatory Reform Under Reagan-The Right Way and the Wrong Way, in Regulation and
the Reagan Era: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Public Interest 41 (B. Yandle & R. Mein-
ers eds. 1989); Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 353 (1985); Kovacic, Built to Last? The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan
Administration, 35 Fed. B. News & J. 244 (June 1988) [hereinafter "Kovacic I"];
Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for
the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 Res. in L &
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In reorienting antitrust policy, Baxter and Miller enjoyed another deci-
sive advantage: they inherited a major, ongoing transformation in doc-
trine which the federal judiciary engineered. Beginning in the mid-1970s,
the federal courts had started to relax the relatively stringent prohibitions
that had characterized the prevailing antitrust jurisprudence of the post-
World War II era.4 These adjustments provided a crucial basis for the
Reagan Administration's antitrust reform movement in the 1980s.5 "I
think it would have been politically impossible," Robert Bork told the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law in 1985, "for a per-
son like Professor [William] Baxter to have done what he did, had there
not been an intellectual shift in the underpinnings of antitrust, a shift in
which he took part before he came to. office." 6 By 1981 the intellectual
shift to which Judge Bork referred had become increasingly apparent in
the antitrust opinions of federal judges.7
Econ. 173 (1989) [hereinafter "Kovacic II"]; A Retrospective Examination of the Reagan
Years, 33 Antitrust Bull. 201 (1988); cf M. Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Eco-
nomics 4 (1991) ("The Reagan 'revolution' in antitrust was but an extension of well-
established trends within the two antitrust agencies. It is, perhaps, no overstatement to
say that while the Reagan administration may have accelerated the pace of change, it was
not decisive.").
4. For examinations of these trends, see Kovacic, Federal Regulation of Business:
Antitrust and Environmental Law, in H. Butler, W. Fischel & W. Kovacic, Significant
Business Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1986-1987 Term 57 (1988) [hereinafter
"Kovacic III"]; Calvani & Sibarium, Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline, 35 Antitrust
Bull. 123 (1990); Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Trans-
formation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter
"Kovacic IV"]; Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characteriza-
tion, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221 (1989).
5. See J. Miller III, The Economist as Reformer: Revamping the FTC, 1981-1985
47-50 (1989); cf M. Eisner, supra note 3, at 230-31 (arguing that Reagan Administration
claimed credit for results of preexisting institutional changes that had given economists
and economics greater influence in the federal enforcement agencies' decision to
prosecute).
6. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 Antitrust L.J. 21, 25
(1985); see also Calvani & Sibarium, supra note 4, at 174 (concluding that modem anti-
trust policy's "most significant changes have been in the case law, influenced by work
done in the academy in the fields of law and industrial organization economics, much of
which predates the Reagan era").
7. From 1975 to 1980, for example, the lower federal courts had recast exclusionary
conduct jurisprudence by embracing relatively permissive antitrust standards governing
single-firm pricing, product design, and promotion behavior. See Hurwitz & Kovacic,
Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 139-50 (1982)
(recounting limited success of plaintiffs in monopolization and attempted monopolization
litigation after 1975). Perhaps the most significant and symbolic event in this develop-
ment was Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
In Berkey, the Second Circuit rejected the expansive implications of Judge Learned
Hand's influential opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), in which Judge Hand broadly interpreted the reach of the Sherman Act's ban
against monopolization. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 272-74; see also Kovacic, Failed Expec-
tations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Decon-
centration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1117-18 (1989) (decribing how Alcoa significantly
enlarged the range of single-firm conduct that could be deemed unlawfully exclusionary).
The Berkey court emphasized that antitrust law should preserve dominant firm incentives
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The judiciary's acceptance of a more conservative antitrust jurispru-
dence in the mid to late 1970s was only the most recent demonstration of
the importance of judicial decisionmaking to the development of anti-
trust doctrine. Since 1890, the comparatively open-ended language of
the principal antitrust statutes8 has given federal judges a crucial role in
determining the content of the statutes' competition commands.9 The
reach of the Sherman Act hinges on the construction of general phrases
such as "conspiracy in restraint of trade"' 0 and "monopolization,"I and
individual judges "have considerable discretion to affect outcomes
through their interpretations"' 2 of antitrust's broad legislative com-
mands. The permeability of the antitrust adjudication process, which af-
fords standing to federal enforcement agencies, state governments,
private citizens, and individual businesses, continually exposes the judici-
ary to a wide array of proposed liability standards from which specific
rules of conduct must be selected. 3 Commenting in 1911 on what fac-
tors would influence the definition of the Sherman Act's operative terms,
future Attorney General and Associate Justice James C. McReynolds
said, "[N]o one can tell with certainty-much depends on the general
economic views entertained by the Judges."' 4
Next to accomplishing a fundamental rewriting of the antitrust stat-
to innovate, stating that "[b]ecause... a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged,
by Section 2 [of the Sherman Act] to compete aggressively on the merits, any success that
it may achieve through 'the process of invention and innovation' is clearly tolerated by
the antitrust laws." Berkey, 603 F.2d at 281 (citations omitted).
8. The three principal substantive provisions of the federal antitrust system under-
score this point. Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1(1988). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire. .. to monopolize... shall be
deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits
any acquisition of stock or assets where "the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). In
addition, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission to ban "[u]nfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
9. See M. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916
117-54 (1988); Blair & Schafer, Antitrust Law and Evolutionary Models of Legal Change,
40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 379, 385-87 (1988); Flynn, Which Past is Prolog? The Future of Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 35 Antitrust. Bull. 879, 885 (1990); Freyer, The Sherman Anti-
trust Act; Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great
Britain. 1880-1920, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 991, 992-93 (1989); see also Kauper, The Justice
Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 Antitrust Bull. 83,
90 (1990) ("Antitrust has a large cast. The central role is played by the federal courts
and, more particularly, the Supreme Court of the United States.").
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
12. Salop & White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in
Private Antitrust Litigation 3, 37 (L. White ed. 1988).
13. See Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law 7-10 (June 20, 1990)
(paper presented at the Western Economic Association International's 65th Annual Con-
ference, San Diego, California) (on file at the Fordham Law Review).
14. A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, Jr., 9 History of the Supreme Court of the United States
166 (1984).
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utes, the power to nominate judges with a shared vision of competition
policy is probably a president's most effective means for ensuring that his
antitrust preferences will endure well after his term of office has ended.15
From 1981 to 1988, the Reagan Administration reshaped the federal ju-
diciary. President Reagan appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, selected three new members for the Court, and accounted for
forty-seven percent of all judges sitting on the federal district courts and
courts of appeals.16 In making these appointments, the Reagan Adminis-
tration sought to alter the federal judiciary's ideological perspective by
choosing individuals who, among other traits, were more likely to doubt
the efficacy of government intervention in the affairs of business.17 Presi-
dents often have used judicial appointments to achieve desired policy
aims, 8 but the Reagan Administration's pursuit of ideological uniform-
15. For a discussion of the significance ofjudicial appointments to the durability of an
administration's antitrust preferences, see Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest:
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement During the Reagan Administration, 33
Antitrust Bull. 467, 495-97 (1988). The choice of judges assumes similar importance in
the application of other federal regulatory schemes. See, e.g., L. Baum, American
Courts-Process and Policy 300 (2d ed. 1990) ("[Iln general, from the Supreme Court to
state intermediate courts, judges' preferences on individual issues and their general posi-
tions on the liberal-conservative spectrum go far toward determining their behavior on
the bench.... Given enough opportunities and sufficient care, a chief executive can have
a fundamental effect on court policies."); R. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The
Case of the Clean Air Act 1 (1983) (observing that, in deciding air pollution cases, federal
courts "have announced sweeping rulings on policy issues left unresolved by existing leg-
islation, often expanding the scope of government programs in the process"); Panel Dis-
cussion, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin. L. Rev.
507, 514-19 (1988) (description by Chief Judge Patricia Wald of D.C. Circuit's formative
role in 1970s in reviewing implementation of new environmental protection legislation).
Judicial appointments may provide an easier means for accomplishing regulatory
change than gaining congressional approval for a retrenchment of existing statutes. The
Reagan Administration's extensive efforts to reform the federal antitrust statutes bore
little fruit. See Kovacic I, supra note 3, at 245; Millstein & Kessler, The Antitrust Legacy
of the Reagan Administration, 33 Antitrust Bull. 505, 532-35 (1988). Despite the Senate's
rejection of Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court and its refusal to act upon
the nominations of Lino Graglia to the Fifth Circuit and Bernard Siegan to the Ninth
Circuit, the Reagan Administration seldom failed to gain confirmation of its candidates
for the federal bench. See also Wald, Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting
Appellate Judges, 6 J. L. & Pol. 15, 17 (1989) ("A single, ideologically-driven administra-
tion can build a clear majority of supporters on an appellate court within a very few
years.").
16. Sheldon Goldman has calculated that, at the time President Reagan left office,
346 of the 736 positions on the federal courts of appeals and district courts were filled by
his appointees. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and
Summing Up, 72 Judicature 318, 318-19 (1989).
17. See H. Schwartz, Packing the Courts 8-9 (1988); Fein, Meese's Dramatic Con-
servative Legacy, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1988, at A15, col. 2; Wermiel, Reagan Choices Alter
the Makeup and Views of the Federal Courts, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1; The
Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22; Law and Economics: A
New Order in the Court?, Bus. Wk., Nov. 16, 1987, at 93; Reagan Justice: A Conservative
Legacy On the Appellate Courts, Legal Times, May/June 1988 (Special Supp.) [hereinaf-
ter "Reagan Justice"].
18. See, e.g., R. Carp & R. Stidham, The Federal Courts 111 (2d ed. 1991) ("In fair-
ness to President Reagan it should be pointed out ... that he was not the only modern
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ity is widely regarded as unmatched in its determination and
thoroughness.1 9
The possibility that the Reagan Administration's appointments might
drastically affect judicial decisionmaking has aroused substantial schol-
arly and popular interest.2' Discussions of Reagan Administration judi-
cial selection frequently assert that nearly all Reagan appointees have
brought conservative policy preferences to the bench.21 These views
often are said to include a desire to limit the scope of antitrust enforce-
ment and other forms of government intervention in the economy.' In a
representative evaluation of the Reagan judiciary, Professor Herman
Schwartz has said that "most recent Republican appointees are consider-
ably more hostile to civil rights, economic regulation, and other liberal
president to pack the bench with those who shared his political and legal philosophies:
Presidents Johnson and Carter both successfully appointed activist liberal judges."); J.
Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System 101 (1981) ("[S]taffmg
Courts of Appeals is rarely left to chance. Circuit judges, like Supreme Court Justices,
are usually former political activists, nominated by politicians and confirmed by politi-
cians, in furtherance of political objectives."); Solomon, The Politics ofAppointment and
the Federal Courts' Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from
T.R. to F.D.R., 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 285 (discussing influence of presidential
policy preferences upon screening of candidates for federal courts of appeals).
19. See H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 9; Bandow, The Conserative JudicialAgenda"
A Critique, in Economic Liberties and the Judiciary 257, 264-65 (. Dorm & H. Manne
eds. 1987); Murphy, Reagan's Judicial Strategy, in Looking Back on the Reagan Presi-
dency 207, 229 (L. Berman ed. 1990); Goldman, supra note 16, at 319-20; Freiwald, The
Mission: Stock Bench, Legal Times, May/June 1988, at 6, 7 (segment from Reagan Jus-
tice, supra note 17).
20. See B. Schwartz, The New Right and the Constitution 222 (1990); H. Schwartz,
supra note 17; Murphy, supra note 19; Fowler, Judicial Selection Under Reagan and
Carter-. A Comparison of Their Initial Recommendation Procedures, 67 Judicature 265
(1984); Fowler, A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection
Under Reagan and Carter, I Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 299 (1983); Goldman, Reaganizing the
Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 Judicature 313 (April-May 1985); Goldman,
supra note 16; Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the US, Court of Appeals" The Con-
tinuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 Judicature 48 (June-July 1986); Mueller, Judicial
Appointments and Antitrust: The '88 Presidential Campaign, 19 Antitrust L. & Econ.
Rev., No. 4, at 45 (1987); Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
Duke L.J. 300; Rowland, Songer & Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy
in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 191 (1988);
Slotnick, Federal Judicial Recruitment and Selection Research. A Review Esay, 71 Judi-
cature 317 (1988); Smith, Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Deci-
sions in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 74 Judicature 133 (1990); Bulkeley, Bush's Plan to
Prosecute Antitrust Cases Could Fail Because of Reaganite Judges, Wall St. J., Aug. 6,
1990, at B4, col. 1; Himmelstein, Antitrust Enforcement Stumbles in Court, Legal Tunes,
July 23, 1990, at 10; Pilon, Rethinking Judicial Restraint, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at
A10, col. 4; Stanfield, Out-Standing in Court, Nat'l J., Feb. 13, 1988, at 388.
21. See, eg., B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 222 ("Almost all the Reagan [judicial]
appointees were conservatives who shared the president's widely expressed desire to tilt
the federal bench to the right."); Mueller, supra note 20, at 47 (due to Reagan administra-
tion judicial appointments, "we now have some 400 Borks ... deciding our constitutional
and statutory rights at the district... and appellate federal levels").
22. See B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 163-89; H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 192-98.
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programs than their Democratic colleagues."2 3 As one of his principal
illustrations of "conservative court packing,"24 Professor Schwartz ob-
serves that "in order to favor business, Reagan judges Robert Bork,
Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and other right-wing antitrust spe-
cialists have encouraged judicial interpretations of the antitrust and other
regulatory laws that conflict with the clear congressional intent."25
The significance of Reagan appointee policy preferences ultimately
hinges upon how such views affect the disposition of specific cases.26
Nonetheless, empirical efforts to test the "conservative court packing"
hypothesis in the context of economic regulation cases have been rare
and relatively narrow in scope. Most assessments of the Reagan judici-
ary have dwelled upon decisions by a small number of prominent
judges.27 Few surveys have used broad-based empirical techniques to
evaluate the impact of Reagan appointees upon the outcomes of specific
groups of economic regulation cases.28
These patterns of scholarly inquiry are evident in evaluations of Rea-
gan appointee decisionmaking in antitrust cases. Despite the centrality
of judicial ideology to the evolution of antitrust doctrine,29 systematic
efforts to assess the influence of recent presidential appointments to the
federal bench in shaping the disposition of antitrust matters have been
uncommon. Antitrust decisions of individual courts 30 or specific
23. H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 8-9.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 41.
26. "The crucial question concerning the relationship of law and politics to the selec-
tion of federal judges is what difference the various selection patterns have made in the
outcomes of cases." Solomon, supra note 18, at 343.
27. For representative examples, see B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 222-49; H.
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 103-67; Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional
Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork; Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 Miami L. Rev. 1171
(1986).
28. Surveys of this type include Wenner, Judicial Oversight of Environmental Deregu-
lation, in Environmental Policy in the 1980s 181 (N. Vig & M. Kraft eds. 1984); Kovacic,
The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointments to the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. Envtl. AfT. L. Rev. 669 (1991); Note, All the President's
Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 87 Colum.
L. Rev. 766 (1987); Wenner, Judicial Restraint Among Reagan Appointees in the D.C.
Circuit's Review of Environmental Cases (1990) (paper presented at the American Polit-
ical Science Association meeting, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1990) (on file at
the Fordham Law Review); see also Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Un-
constitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J. L., Econ., & Org. 183, 190-97
(1991) (evaluating, among other factors, influence of political party affiliation and presi-
dential appointments upon voting by federal district court judges in cases dealing with
the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission).
29. See Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50 L. & Contemp.
Probs., No. 4, at 199-216 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Tri-
umph of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 319 (influence of Chicago School eco-
nomic perspectives on evolution of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence); Hovenkamp
& Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 Ariz. St. L.J. 443 (Ninth
Circuit doctrines governing dominant firm pricing conduct); Markovitz, The Burger
[Vol. 60
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judges31 have attracted continuing scholarly attention. By contrast, few
broad-based studies have sought to analyze the effect of judicial appoint-
ments, particularly to courts other than the Supreme Court, upon voting
behavior in antitrust cases.3
This Article considers the influence of judicial appointments upon an-
titrust decisionmaking by examining the votes of Carter, Reagan, and
Bush appointees to the federal courts of appeals.33 It approaches the
subject in three parts. The first presents the results of data gathered from
a review of 1031 reported court of appeals decisions issued from January
20, 1977, through December 31, 1990, in which the appellate panel in-
cluded at least one Carter or Reagan appointee. The data show that
Carter and Reagan appointees alike tended to vote conservatively in a
substantial percentage of antitrust matters before them. Reagan appoin-
tees, however, voted conservatively more often than their Carter
counterparts.
Section II examines the voting behavior of Carter and Reagan court of
appeals appointees in discrete areas of antitrust jurisprudence: monopo-
lization and attempted monopolization cases involving allegations of
predatory pricing; vertical restraints cases; tying cases; merger cases;
price discrimination cases; and decisions based chiefly upon the resolu-
tion of standing and antitrust injury issues. This segment of the Article
relies upon 53 predatory pricing cases, 123 vertical restraints cases, 70
tying cases, 35 merger cases, 48 price discrimination cases, and 71 stand-
ing/antitrust injury cases. Reagan appointees have voted more conserva-
tively than their Carter counterparts in these discrete areas, with the
Court, Antitrust, and Economic Analysis, in The Burger Court 180 (V. Blasi ed. 1983)
(evaluating Burger Court's application of economic analysis in deciding antitrust dis-
putes); Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The
First Thirteen Years, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (1982) (economic underpinnings of Bur-
ger Court antitrust decisions).
31. See e.g., Kramer, The Road to City of Berkeley: The Antitrust Positions of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, 32 Antitrust Bull. 335 (1987) (antitrust decisions and voting behav-
ior of Justice Thurgood Marshall); Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 999
(1987) (antitrust and labor law decisions of Judge Richard Posner); Comment, Changing
Configurations ofAntitrust Law: Judge Posner's Applications of His Economic Analysis to
Antitrust Doctrine, 32 De Paul L. Rev. 839 (1983) (antitrust decisions of Judge Posner).
32. For noteworthy exceptions, see Cohen, The Role of Criminal Sanctions in Anti-
trust Enforcement, 4 Contemp. Pol'y Issues 36, 42-43 (1989) (presenting data on sentenc-
ing decisions in antitrust cases by Republican appointees and Democratic appointees,
respectively); Judges Versus Juries in Antitrust: Rush to Summary Judgment, 20 Anti-
trust L. & Econ. Rev., No. 2, at 1 (1988) [hereinafter Judges Versus Juries] (discussing
patterns in court of appeals antitrust opinions issued in 1987).
33. This Article compares the voting of Reagan and Bush appointees to that of Carter
appointees because one of the Reagan Administration's stated aims was to abandon the
judicial selection philosophy that had guided President Carter's choice of judicial nomi-
nees. As Christopher Smith explains, "[c]learly the Reagan administration's efforts to
shape the judiciary evinced an intention to change the federal courts by generating differ-
ent judicil outcomes than those produced by President Carter's Democratic appointees."
Smith, supra note 20, at 133.
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most substantial disparities in voting behavior emerging in the merger
and vertical restraints subsets.
Section III discusses noteworthy qualitative features of the cases de-
cided by Carter and Reagan appointees. The data indicate that conserva-
tive antitrust perspectives have deeply influenced a significant number of
Carter appellate judges. This trend reflects a rightward shift in Supreme
Court and academic antitrust thinking since the early 1970s, as well as
changes in the economic and political environment in the United States.
The survey also suggests caution in assuming that Reagan appointees in-
variably will embrace analytical approaches that exculpate antitrust de-
fendants. In several important respects, Reagan court of appeals judges
have not abided by the one-dimensional, laissez faire preferences that the
conservative court packing hypothesis attributes to the Reagan judiciary.
At the same time, this Article finds that President Reagan's strategy of
appointing conservative academics to the appellate bench will pay signifi-
cant dividends to his administration's campaign to retrench antitrust
doctrine.
Section IV considers the importance of judicial appointments for anti-
trust policy in the 1990s. Recent federal and state enforcement activity
has revived some antitrust approaches the Reagan Administration disfa-
vored. In addition, ongoing developments in the legal and economic an-
titrust literature have generated analytical models that antitrust plaintiffs
might use to rehabilitate theories of liability that lay dormant during the
1980s. The impact of these developments will depend heavily upon
whether the Bush Administration adheres to the appointment philosophy
that guided Reagan judicial selection. As reinvigorated public and pri-
vate plaintiffs approach the federal courts, the Reagan-Bush judiciary
will play a major role in determining how far the antitrust pendulum
swings back toward its pre-Reagan equilibrium.
I. VOTING BEHAVIOR BY CARTER AND REAGAN APPOINTEES:
BROAD PERSPECTIVE
From a reading of the leading commentaries on Reagan Administra-
tion judicial selection, one might conclude that the Reagan judges have
ushered in a dramatically more conservative antitrust jurisprudence. 34
Such an impression rests largely upon the highly visible roles of antitrust
scholars such as Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and
Ralph Winter on the federal courts of appeals.3" As indicated below,
34. See H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 68-70, 192-96.
35. In a brief discussion of Reagan appointee voting in antitrust matters, Professor
Bernard Schwartz focuses solely upon the decisions of Judge Richard Posner. B.
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 238. Professor Herman Schwartz deals more extensively with
Reagan appointee voting in antitrust cases, but his treatment of antitrust matters focuses
solely upon prominent, economically-oriented academics such as Robert Bork, Pasco
Bowman, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia, J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
and Ralph Winter. H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 68-70, 195-96.
[Vol. 60
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these individuals have influenced judicially-developed antitrust doc-
trine.3 6 There remains, however, the intriguing question of whether the
views of these judges are representative of the vast (and lesser known)
balance of Reagan appointees who have voted in antitrust matters.
Rather than considering the decisions of a small number of well-known
judges, this section presents a broader perspective on the Reagan judici-
ary's antitrust voting tendencies.
A. Selection of Cases
This Article focuses on antitrust decisions of the federal courts of ap-
peals. To assess the impact of Reagan appointments, this Article com-
pares Reagan judicial voting records with those of court of appeals
judges appointed by President Carter.37 A comparison with Carter ap-
pointee voting is appropriate, as it permits one to observe whether the
votes of Reagan judges differ significantly from judges appointed by a
president whose ideology the Reagan Administration assailed as exces-
sively liberal. The selection of cases for study proceeded in essentially
three steps.35
1. Judges
A roster of all Carter and Reagan appointees to the federal courts of
appeals was assembled.39 This roster included individuals who continue
to serve on the court of appeals, as well as those who subsequently re-
signed their positions or otherwise left office.' Judges who were elevated
from the federal district court to the court of appeals were included only
as of the day of their confirmation to the appellate court.4 ' Judges are
36. See infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
37. Bush appointees voted in only two court of appeals antitrust decisions published
during the survey period. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (panel including Judge Clarence Thomas); Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co. v.
Consolidated Ry. Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir.) (panel including Judge John Walker),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1990). This Article includes the Bush nominees' votes in
these matters in the Reagan appointee totals.
38. For each of these steps, I am enormously indebted to my two research assistants,
Steven Taylor and Sean Coleman. A complete list of all cases addressed in the survey is
on file with the author.
39. This roster was compiled by reviewing the membership listings contained in each
volume of the Federal Reporter (Second) published from January 1977 through Decem-
ber 1990 and commercially available reference works providing biographical and appoint-
ment information on federal judges. See 1991 Judicial Staff Directory (A. Brownson ed.
1990); 1990 Judicial Staff Directory (A. Brownson ed. 1989); 1989 Judicial Staff Direc-
tory (A. Brownson ed. 1988); 1988 Judicial Staff Directory (C. Brownson & A. Brownson
eds. 1987).
40. For example, the survey includes cases in which Robert Bork participated on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from his confirmation in 1982
until his resignation in 1988. Similarly, the survey counts cases in which Antonin Scalia
participated on the D.C. Circuit from his confirmation in 1982 until he became an associ-
ate justice of the Supreme Court in 1986.
41. For example, Judge Bruce Selya was appointed to the U.S. District Court for
Rhode Island in 1982 and was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
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counted as being Carter or Reagan appointees according to the president
who appointed them to the court of appeals.42 The survey counts cases
in which Carter or Reagan appointees to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for one circuit participated by designation in the decisions of other
circuits. 43
2. Cases: Initial Screening
The initial universe of cases for study consisted of all cases meeting
four criteria:' (a) a Carter or Reagan appointee participated on the
panel deciding the case;45 (b) the case involved, directly or indirectly,
federal antitrust issues;' (c) the case was decided from January 20, 1977
Circuit in 1986. The survey omits votes cast by Judge Selya when he participated in First
Circuit cases by designation during his tenure on the U.S. District Court. One such case
is Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (lst Cir. 1985).
42. For example, Judge Juan Torruella was appointed to the U.S. District Court for
Puerto Rico in 1974 by President Ford and was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in 1984 by President Reagan. Because President Reagan made the
appointment to the First Circuit, Judge Torruella is counted as a Reagan appointee.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit presents an unusual situation. The
Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
(FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). The FCLA abolished the United States Court of Claims and the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and provided that judges then sitting on the two
predecessor tribunals would form the bench of the new Federal Circuit. This survey
includes the votes of judges who (a) were appointed by Presidents Carter or Reagan to
the United States Claims Court or the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals and were reassigned to the Federal Circuit in 1982, or (b) were appointed to the
Federal Circuit by Presidents Reagan or Bush after enactment of the FCIA. By this
principle, the survey excludes the votes of Federal Circuit judges such as Howard Mar-
key, who was appointed by President Nixon in 1972 to the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals and was reassigned to the Federal Circuit in 1982.
43. One such case is Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414 (11th
Cir. 1990), in which the Eleventh Circuit panel included Judge Jesse Eschbach of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
44. LEXIS and WESTLAW data bases were the, principal means used to identify rele-
vant cases. The results of LEXIS and WESTLAW searches were checked against a re-
view of the court of appeals decision indices contained in each volume of the Commerce
Clearing House Trade Cases.
45. Most cases reviewed for this Article were decided by three-judge panels. Thus, a
case decided by a three-judge panel containing at least one Carter or Reagan appointee
was included. En banc decisions in which at least one Carter or Reagan appointee partic-
ipated also were included.
46. Deleted were cases in which the sole antitrust matters involved state antitrust
claims, including instances in which federal antitrust jurisprudence supplied the sole or
chief basis for interpreting the state antitrust statutes in question. See, e.g., Chuck's Feed
& Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir.) (adjudicating vertical re-
straints claim based upon South Carolina antitrust statute), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827
(1987); Pounds Photographic Labs, Inc. v. Noritsu Am. Corp., 818 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.
1987) (adjudicating vertical restraints claim based upon Texas antitrust statute);
Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (1986), modified, 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir.
1987) (adjudicating vertical restraints claim based upon California antitrust statute). In
addition, cases involving Federal Trade Commission consumer protection activities were
omitted. See, eg., American Fin. Serv. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(evaluating validity of FTC trade regulation rule governing credit practices), cert. denied,
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(the date of President Carter's inauguration), through December 31,
1990 and (d) the court of appeals opinion in the case was reported in
either the Federal Reporter (Second) or the Commerce Clearing House
Trade Cases. The initial search yielded a total of 1031 decisions meeting
these criteria.
3. Cases: Screening for Substantive Issues
After analyzing the 1031 cases, the list of cases for further study was
limited to matters involving substantive antitrust issues concerning
standing, liability standards, and remedies. This criterion screened out a
number of decisions dealing exclusively or chiefly with issues having little
to do with antitrust doctrine. Examples of categories of omitted cases
included matters such as the enforcement of subpoenas and civil investi-
gative demands,47 proceedings to impose sanctions for document de-
struction and other forms of obstruction of justice," state efforts to gain
access to data collected by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies,49
the arbitrability of antitrust claims, 50 imposition of sanctions for discov-
ery abuses,51 standards for determining the certification of a plaintiff
class,52 standards governing interlocutory appeals of trial court orders,53
and challenges to the Federal Trade Commission's constitutionality
raised in the context of antitrust disputes.' These deletions decreased
the universe of relevant cases from 1031 to 897. The remaining 897 mat-
ters provided the basis for this Article's findings.55
B. Classification of Votes
As a baseline for comparing the voting records of Carter and Reagan
475 U.S. 1011 (1986); American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982)
(deceptive advertising case). Also eliminated were cases decided under statutes such as
the Bank Holding Company Act, whose competition provisions are interpreted in light of
federal antitrust jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dibidale of La., Inc. v. American Bank & Trust
Co., 916 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (anti-tying provisions of Bank Holding Company Act);
Lane v. Central Bank of Ala., N.A., 756 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1985) (same). Finally, the
survey deleted cases addressing competition issues under the Newspaper Preservation
Act. See, e.g., Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C.
Cir.) (interpreting application of Newspaper Preservation Act), aff'd, 493 U.S. 38 (1989);
Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 892 (1983).
47. See FTC v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48. See United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
49. See Mattox v. FTC, 752 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1985).
50. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st
Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); University Life Ins. Co. v.
Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. See Sciambra v. Graham News Co., 841 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
855 (1988).
52. See Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983).
53. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
54. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
55. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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judicial appointees, this Article identified a "conservative" antitrust
agenda mainly by reference to Reagan Administration antitrust prefer-
ences.56 With some exceptions noted below, the enforcement objectives
articulated by Reagan antitrust officials defined the difference between a
liberal vote and a conservative vote. The following discussion presents
specific benchmarks used to determine whether votes in antitrust cases
would be deemed consistent with a conservative antitrust agenda.
1. Single-Firm Exclusionary Conduct
Orthodox conservative thinking in antitrust is suspicious of liability
theories that proscribe single-firm exclusionary behavior.5 The con-
servative vision in antitrust accords individual firms broad discretion to
choose pricing, promotion, and product development strategies. Accord-
ingly, conservatives usually reject claims of predatory pricing, predatory
promotion, or exclusionary product development. During the Reagan
Administration, federal enforcement leaders strongly criticized antitrust
policies that closely scrutinized dominant firm pricing, product develop-
ment, and promotion behavior.58 Reagan enforcement officials also ex-
pressed skepticism toward theories designed to compel monopolists to
provide access to "essential facilities."5 9 Thus, this Article classifies as
conservative decisions that adopt a permissive view toward single-firm
conduct. 6°
56. These preferences are detailed in Kovacic I, supra note 3, at 244-45; Kovacic II,
supra note 3, at 177-78; Kovacic, supra note 15, at 477-79. In their effort "to define the
sometimes slippery terms liberal and conservative," Professors Carp and Stidham suggest
that "[ijn the area of government regulation of the economy, liberal judges would proba-
bly uphold legislation that benefitted working people or the economic underdog." R.
Carp & R. Stidham, supra note 18, at 114 (emphasis in original).
57. For representative statements of this view, see generally Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981) (concluding that the theo-
retical basis for a rule against predation is too weak, the measures for assessing damages
too inaccurate, and the administrative costs too high to justify judicial intervention to
control single-firm pricing); Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Tur-
ner to Matsushita, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1052 (1986) (rejecting theories which focus
exclusively on price/cost margins and advocating judicial adoption of analytical tech-
niques that would discourage the filing and maintenance of predatory pricing cases).
58. See Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Marketplace: When Is an Antitrust
Response Appropriate?, 57 Antitrust L.J. 421, 422 (1988); 60 Minutes with Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 55 Antitrust L.J. 255, 263
(1986).
59. See Panel Discussion, Exclusionary Conduct, 57 Antitrust L.J. 723, 742 (1989)
(statement of William F. Baxter).
60. Examples of single-firm conduct decisions treated as conservative in this Article
include cases such as Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d
1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting predatory hiring allegation); Twin Laboratories, Inc.
v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting essential facility
allegation); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1420 (7th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting predatory pricing allegation). Decisions classified as liberal include
cases such as Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1439-44
(6th Cir. 1990) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff on attempted monopolization and mo-
nopolization claims based upon defendant's acquisition of various raw material input
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The conservative antitrust agenda would not completely abandon at-
tention to the Sherman Act prohibition on monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization. These causes of action are deemed appropriate
to challenge some efforts by private entities to invoke the machinery of
government to exclude rivals." For example, Reagan antitrust enforce-
ment officials stated that the initiation of meritless, vexatious proceedings
before judicial bodies and administrative boards should be condemned.'
Nonetheless, antitrust complaints premised upon alleged misuse of gov-
ernment processes often raise significant First Amendment concerns.
The evolution of what commonly is known as the Noerr doctrine' has
reflected considerable wariness on the part of liberal and conservative
jurists alike about using antitrust liability to restrict protected speech or
petitioning activity." Because it is difficult to characterize as liberal or
conservative the outcomes in cases that involve the abuse of government
processes, this Article segregates the results for Noerr decisions and other
cases focusing on antitrust immunity issues.6
sources and use of lengthy non-competition agreements); HJ., Inc. v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1542 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding plaintiff's jury verdict on
predatory pricing claims); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d
1509, 1522 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding plaintiff's verdict on monopolization claim pre-
mised upon essential facility and refusal to deal theories), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
61. The modem revival of this line of analysis is largely attributable to the work of
Robert Bork. See R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 347-64 (1978); see also Kovacic IV,
supra note 4, at 1457 (discussing Bork's influence on modern Section 2 jurisprudence
when the case involves vexatious litigation).
62. See Calvani & Tritell, Invocation of Unitel States Import Relief Laws as an Anti-
trust Violation, 31 Antitrust Bull. 527, 536-37 (1986).
63. The Noerr doctrine is derived chiefly from three Supreme Court decisions: Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. No-
err Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The Noerr doctrine has been applied to
shield a variety of efforts to influence the legislative, executive, administrative, and adju-
dicatory processes of government bodies. See Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the
First Amendmen" The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 Antitrust LJ. 327, 333 (1988); Hur-
witz, Abuse of Government Processes, the First Amendment and the Boundaries of Noerr,
74 Geo. LJ. 65, 79-85 (1985).
64. The D.C. Circuit's treatment of Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856
F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), illustrates the hazards of using a
liberal/conservative distinction to classify abuse of government process cases. In Trial
Lawyers, the D.C. Circuit vacated an FTC order enjoining a refusal by a group of attor-
neys in the District of Columbia to accept further assignments to represent indigent crim-
inal defendants unless the city raised the fees for such work. The Commission had ruled
that the collective refusal to deal constituted an illegal group boycott under the antitrust
laws. See In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510 (1984), vacated, 856
F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990). The D.C. Circuit panel, which
included Reagan appointees Douglas Ginsburg and Laurence Silberman, ruled that the
FTC had failed to give appropriate weight to the "expressive" content of the lawyers'
boycott. See Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 233. Judge Ginsburg's majority opinion re-
manded the case to the Commission for further proceedings to determine whether the
District of Columbia's decision to raise the lawyers' fees stemmed from the lawyers' mar-
ket power or, alternatively, from the persuasive impact of the lawyers' political message.
See iL at 252-53.
65. The survey computes the antitrust votes of Carter and Reagan appointees by sep-
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2. Shared Monopolization and Market Coordination
Conservative antitrust circles disapprove of enforcement theories
designed to show that oligopolists have restrained output by taking ac-
count of their interdependence. For example, the Reagan Administra-
tion's transition team for the FTC severely criticized the Commission's
shared monopolization initiatives of the 1970s.66 Reagan antitrust en-
forcement officials also expressed considerable skepticism towards theo-
ries that supply a basis for attacking interfirm coordination by
prohibiting facilitating practices.' Cases using such theories are likely to
fall outside what most conservative commentators regard as the core of
proper antitrust enforcement activity.6 g
3. Horizontal Restraints
Conservative analysis divides horizontal restraints into two categories.
The first consists of conventional bid-rigging, price-fixing, or market allo-
cation schemes for which there are no redeeming efficiency justifications.
Some conservative commentators believe that horizontal price-fixing is
often pro-competitive or benign and should not be subject to summary
condemnation. 69 However, most conservative antitrust scholars have ar-
arately presenting the results for (a) all decision dealing with immunity doctrines such as
Noerr, and (b) all decisions other than matters dealing chiefly with immunity doctrines
such as Noerr, state action, and actual or implied statutory immunity. Examples of deci-
sions that, due to the overriding importance of Noerr issues to the outcome, are treated in
this survey as immunity cases include Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.,
817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v.
National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). Cases in which the disposition of
Noerr issues is not crucial to the outcome are treated as non-immunity decisions. See
Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of
plaintiff's suit on grounds that plaintiff failed to prove antitrust injury and that defend-
ant's conduct enjoyed Noerr immunity from antitrust liability).
66. See Reagan FTC Transition Team Report, Conclusions and Recommendations,
999 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) G-1 (Jan. 29, 1981).
67. See J. Miller III, supra note 5, at 44-45, 54-65; 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule,
Assistant Attorney General 4ntitrust Division, 57 Antitrust L.J. 257, 262 (1988).
68. For this reason, the Article classifies as conservative decisions such as E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984), in which the Second
Circuit denied enforcement of an FTC order prohibiting the noncollusive adoption of
various facilitating practices. At the same time, the survey also applies a conservative
classification to cases in which the challenged means for attempted monopolization or
monopolization consists of direct efforts by one firm to enlist a rival in a plan to restrict
output and raise prices. See United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114,
1118-19, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1984) (invitation by chief executive officer of one airline to
chief executive officer of rival firm to fix prices deemed attempted monopolization where
formation of a cartel would have monopolized the market), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001
(1985).
69. See D. Armentano, Antitrust Policy: The Case for Repeal 61-67 (1986); Bit-
tlingmayer, Decreasing 4verage Cost and Competition: 4 New Look at the Addyston Pipe
Case, 25 J. L. & Econ. 201, 201-03, 228-29 (1982); Dewey, Economists and.4ntitrust: The
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gued that antitrust doctrine should prohibit such conduct on a per se
basis.7" Consistent with this approach, the Reagan Antitrust Division
mounted an unprecedented program to detect and prosecute horizontal
price-fixing.
7 1
The second category of horizontal restraints consists of restrictions
adopted pursuant to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic ac-
tivity. Conservative commentators call for these restrictions to be evalu-
ated by a rule of reason that weighs procompetitive benefits against
anticompetitive dangers. 72 A common conservative criticism of Warren-
era antitrust jurisprudence is that the Supreme Court failed to distinguish
"hard-core" price-fixing from restraints whose purpose was to increase
the efficiency of legitimate forms of horizontal collaboration.73 Reagan
antitrust officials embraced analytical techniques that gave fuller effect to
efficiency claims in evaluating horizontal arrangements. 74
Circular Road, 35 Antitrust Bull. 349, 363-64 (1990); High, Bork's Paradox: Static vs
Dynamic Efficiency in Antitrust Analysis, 3 Contemp. Pol'y Issues 21 (1984-85); Smith,
Why Not Abolish Antitrust?, Regulation, Jan./Feb. 1983, at 23, 27; see also H. Demsetz,
One Hundred Years of Antitrust: Should We Celebrate? 9-10 (1991) (predicting future
extension of rule of reason to various price agreements now subject to outright
condemnation).
70. See R. Bork, supra note 61, at 263-68, 406; Ginsburg, The Appropriate Role of the
Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1277, 1282 (1988); Panel Discussion,
Interview with Whliam F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney Genera Antitrust Division, 50 Anti-
trust LJ. 151, 153 (1981). Examples of survey cases that are classified as conservative
because they affirm criminal convictions on antitrust counts for what appear to be
unadorned bid-rigging agreements include United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d
1559 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction for horizontal bid-rigging conspiracy), cert
denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312
(4th Cir. 1982) (contract allocation scheme and bid-rigging deemed per se violation of the
antitrust laws; convictions of defendants sustained); United States v. Inryco, Inc., 642
F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding conviction of defendant found to have participated in
horizontal bid-rigging conspiracy), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1167 (1982). This survey
also applies a conservative classification to decisions that support findings of civil liability
for horizontal price-fixing and allocations of territories or customers. One example is
Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). In Auivod,
the Second Circuit sustained a jury verdict for a plaintiff theater operator who challenged
a "movie split" agreement by its rivals to allocate first-run films among themselves. See
idi at 889-90. Although it did not state whether the trial court applied a per se or rule of
reason standard, the Second Circuit's opinion indicates that the horizontal behavior
amounted to an allocation of markets that would be subject to per se condemnation.
71. See Rule, Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws" Targeting Naked Cartel
Restraints, 57 Antitrust LJ. 257, 260-63 (1988); Whalley, Department of Justice Enforce-
ment Practice and Case Selection, 57 Antitrust LJ. 569, 569-72 (1988).
72. See R. Bork, supra note 61, at 406-07.
73. See Kovacic I, supra note 4, at 57-58.
74. See In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 602
(1988) (final order); In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 386-88 (1984) (consent
order); U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 3,109, at 20,593-95 (Nov. 10, 1988); Muris, The
New Rule of Reason, 57 Antitrust LJ. 859, 859-61 (1989). Examples of cases in this
survey that employ this approach and are treated as conservative include Drury Inn-
Colorado Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1989) (rule of reason used to
evaluate covenant by which seller of land for hotel promised not to sell adjacent parcel
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Within this general framework there are difficult classification choices.
Defendants in horizontal restraints cases may argue that their conduct
has efficiency properties that warrant application of a reasonableness test
rather than per se condemnation. Commentators have observed that
courts sometimes incorrectly have chosen to use reasonableness stan-
dards to assess conduct that poses genuine competitive dangers while of-
for construction of a lower-priced hotel); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rule of reason used to assess alleged horizon-
tal output restriction), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); National Bancard Corp. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 603-05 (1 lth Cir.) (rule of reason used to examine price-
related restrictions adopted in connection with creation of credit card network), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
This survey also accords conservative status to decision that emphasize the need to
draw careful distinctions between naked and ancillary restraints, yet ultimately conclude
that the defendant has failed to offer sufficient proof to defeat liability. One example of a
decision classified as conservative is General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984). In General Leaseways, the Seventh Circuit used a
"quick look" inquiry to determine "if the elimination of competition is apparent." Id. at
595. Judge Posner's opinion for the court applied a per se standard after concluding that
the defendant's horizontal market division was not "ancillary to the reciprocal provision
of service or any other lawful activity." Id. A second illustration of a case that is treated
as conservative on the basis of its analytical methodology is United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980). In Realty Multi-List, the Fifth Circuit
evaluated a Justice Department challenge to membership criteria promulgated by a real
estate multiple listing service. Following an extensive analysis of the rationales underly-
ing per se and rule of reason standards, the court concluded that per se condemnation
was inappropriate. See id. at 1361-69. The court then applied a reasonableness test and
reversed the trial court's finding that the membership restrictions were facially reasonable
and justified a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. See id. at 1381-89.
Although the court's assessment of the purpose and effect of the conduct is in some re-
spects questionable, its methodology and result are deemed conservative.
Some of the most difficult classification issues involving horizontal restraints deal with
the conduct of sports leagues and conferences. One case classified as liberal is Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In NCAA, the Tenth Circuit used a per se standard
to condemn restrictions that the NCAA imposed on its member schools concerning the
sale of broadcast rights for college football games. See id. at 1152-56. Although it also
found the challenged arrangements invalid under a rule of reason standard, the court's
view that the NCAA television plan "constitutes illegal per se price fixing" inappropri-
ately slighted efficiency justifications for the challenged restraints. See id. at 1156. By
contrast, the survey gives a conservative classification to Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
990 (1984), in which the Ninth Circuit used a rule of reason analysis to evaluate a sport
league's restrictions upon the movement of its franchises. The Ninth Circuit sustained a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, ruling that a reasonable jury applying a rule of reason stan-
dard could have found that the National Football League violated the Sherman Act by
restraining the movement of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. See id. at 1390-98.
Although the Ninth Circuit seems to have undervalued the league's justifications for the
restrictions in question, its analytical methodology largely coincides with the conservative
classification criteria used in this Article. For another illustration of a sports league deci-
sion whose analysis warrants a conservative label, see also National Basketball Ass'n v.
SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir.) (reversing trial court's grant
of summary judgment that treated league's franchise relocation rule as per se invalid),
cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987).
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fering no apparent efficiency benefits.75 Thus, in classifying decisions as
liberal or conservative, one must assess whether the court used the cor-
rect standard (summary condemnation versus a more elaborate inquiry)
and, if a reasonableness test is chosen, whether the standard has been
applied with appropriate attention to efficiency concerns. Efficiency ar-
guments have been raised and rejected in several recent criminal horizon-
tal restraints matters, particularly in suits challenging schemes to rig bids
or allocate customers for public contracts.76 For this survey, the defend-
ants' asserted bases for avoiding per se condemnation in such matters are
considered unpersuasive. Thus, cases applying per se rules in such in-
stances are deemed conservative.
4. Vertical Restraints
To conservative antitrust scholars, vertical restraints almost invariably
serve desirable efficiency ends. Thus, conduct such as resale price main-
tenance, vertical allocations of marketing territories, exclusive dealing,
requirements contracts, and tying arrangements should be deemed legal
per se. 7 Reagan Administration enforcement policies reflected this view.
From 1981 through 1988, the federal enforcement agencies issued no
complaints or consent orders involving vertical restraints in matters initi-
ated after the Reagan appointees assumed the leadership positions at the
Antitrust Division and the FTC.7 8 This survey classifies as conservative
decisions that reject challenges to vertical restraints.79
75. See Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Power, Access,
and Legitimacy, 59 Antitrust LJ. 339, 353-55 (1990). In Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc.,
874 F.2d 1417, 1428 (11th Cir. 1989), amended, 893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 401 (1990) (per curiam), a split Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for defendants who had engaged in what Professor Calkins properly labels "a
classic market allocation scheme." Calkins, supra, at 353. This survey applies a con-
servative classification to both the majority opinion (authored by Carter appointee Joseph
Hatchett) for its caution in using per se standards and to the dissent (written by Carter
appointee Thomas Clark) for its appraisal of the conduct in question as an unadorned
horizontal market allocation.
76. See United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 496-98 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. CL 1388 (1991); United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 472-
73 (10th Cir. 1990).
77. See R. Bork, supra note 61, at 288-98, 309, 372-81, 406; Posner, The Next Step in
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 8
(1981).
78. See Gellhorn & Fenton, Vertical Restraints During the Reagan Administration: A
Program in Search of a Policy, 33 Antitrust Bull. 543, 547-48 (1988); Kovacic I, supra
note 3, at 245.
79. Examples of conservative decisions examined in this survey include cases such as
Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1582-83 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
allegations of resale price maintenance); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (relying on business justification defense to reject
tying allegation), cert denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC,
718 F.2d 256, 258-60 (8th Cir. 1983) (denying enforcement of FTC order based upon
finding that manufacturer had violated Section I of Sherman Act by refusing to sell to
retailers who would not sell at manufacturer's suggested retail price). Examples of liberal
decisions contained in this survey include cases such as Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's House
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5. Mergers
A conservative merger policy would prohibit only horizontal mergers
involving firms with large market shares. Smaller horizontal mergers, all
vertical transactions, and all purely conglomerate consolidations would
be disregarded." In a representative statement of conservative merger
philosophy, Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox proposed that merger en-
forcement policy should be limited to banning "[h]orizontal mergers cre-
ating very large market shares (those that leave fewer than three
significant rivals in any market).""1
During the Reagan Administration, the FTC and the Antitrust Divi-
sion adhered to some elements of this approach.82 The federal agencies
initiated no cases challenging conglomerate or vertical transactions.8 3 In
setting horizontal merger enforcement policy, the federal agencies raised
the threshold of illegality well above levels that had prevailed during the
1970s." Nonetheless, in their merger guidelines and in their enforce-
ment choices, the FTC and the Antitrust Division stopped considerably
short of the more permissive standards that Judge Bork and other con-
servative commentators had proposed.85 This Article uses the more ex-
treme standards of the Antitrust Paradox, rather than the Reagan
Administration's merger guidelines, as the basis for characterizing voting
Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1519 (2d Cir. 1989) (reversing and remanding
dismissal of tying claim); Metrix Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828
F.2d 1033, 1036-45 (4th Cir. 1987) (sustaining plaintiff's verdict in tying case), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 423-29 (5th Cir.
1985) (sustaining plaintiff's verdict in resale price maintenance case).
80. See R. Bork, supra note 61, at 406.
81. Id. at 406; see also Y. Brozen, Mergers in Perspective 85 (1982) ("The possibility
of temporary monopoly may be a reason for scrutinizing closely horizontal mergers en-
compassing more than 50 percent of an industry's capacity in times when there is no
excess capacity in the industry, but there is no reason at all for discouraging conglomer-
ate or vertical mergers."); cf. R. Posner, Antitrust Law 112 (1976) ("The revisions in our
thinking about mergers call for conservative rules of liability. There is little basis in cur-
rent thinking for automatic intervention in markets in which the four largest firms have a
combined market share of less than 60 percent.").
82. See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Adminis-
tration, 33 Antitrust Bull. 211, 225-28 (1988).
83. See Kovacic IV, supra note 4, at 1453-54.
84. See Report of the American Bar Association Section ofAntitrust Law Task Force on
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, reprinted in 58 Antitrust L.J. 747,
758-61 (1989) (hereinafter "Task Force Report"); see also Baker, Government Enforce-
ment of Section Two, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 898, 926 (1986) (observing that Reagan
antitrust enforcement officials took "many more chances on horizontal mergers than
[their] predecessors did").
85. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 3,100
(June 14, 1984); Federal Trade Commission Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 3,200 (June 14, 1982); Kovacic IV, supra note 4, at 1452-53;
see also Paradox Revisited: Interview with Judge Robert H. Bork, 3 Antitrust 16, 17(Summer 1989) (comment by Robert Bork observing that enforcement thresholds in Rea-
gan Administration's merger guidelines "are probably too low. But there is such an im-
provement over what went before.").
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behavior as liberal or conservative in merger cases. 6
6. Price-Discrimination
Conservative commentators regard the Robinson-Patman Act" as a
singularly destructive influence in antitrust.8 Conservative notions of
appropriate antitrust policy would endorse efforts to constrict the reach
of, if not eliminate, the statute's ban on price discrimination. From 1981
through 1988, the Reagan FTC reduced already low levels of federal
Robinson-Patman enforcement activity 9 and initiated a single case alleg-
ing illegal price discrimination.' This survey characterizes as conserva-
tive cases that reject Robinson-Patman price discrimination allegations.9"
86. By this standard, the survey applies a conservative characterization to cases such
as FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (sustaining challenge
to merger that would have reduced number of industry participants from three firms to
two); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (re-
jecting challenge to merger on ground that ease of entry rebutted presumption of illegal-
ity arising from post-acquisition market share of 48.8 percent). Using the same
classification principle, the survey attaches liberal status to the outcome of Hospital Corp.
of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding challenge to merger that
reduced number of substantial firms in relevant market to four), cerL denied, 481 U.S.
1038 (1987).
A difficult classification problem is posed by United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). The Seventh Circuit
upheld the Justice Department's challenge to the merger of two hospital firms yielding a
combined market share of between 64 and 72 percent. See id. at 1283. Judge Posner's
majority opinion does not make clear the number and size of other remaining firms. The
district court's opinion suggested that the post-acquisition market included two other
firms with shares of about 18 percent and 10 percent, respectively. See United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1280-81 (N.D. I. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d
1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). Given the apparently small size of the
third firm (10 percent market share) in relation to its two rivals (72 percent and 18 per-
cent market shares, respectively), this survey treats the post-merger market in Rockford
as lacking the "three significant firms" that the Antitrust Paradox proposed as sufficient
to avoid antimerger liability. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's Rockford decision is classified
as conservative.
87. Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 692, Ch. 592,49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)).
88. See R. Bork, supra note 61, at 382-401; R. Posner, The Robinson-Patman Act:
Federal Regulation of Price Differences 49, 52-53 (1976).
89. See Kovacic II, supra note 3, at 177.
90. In 1988, the FTC issued Robinson-Patman complaints against five book publish-
ing firms, alleging that the respondents had granted illegal discounts to major bookstore
chains. See Harper & Row, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 2,634 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 1988).
91. Examples of price discrimination decisions classified as conservative include cases
such as Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying
enforcement of FIC price discrimination order); Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
799 F.2d 415, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting price discrimination claim for failure to
show injury to competition); Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 715 F.2d 703,
712 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of Robinson-Patman claims). Examples of price
discrimination decisions classified as liberal include cases such as J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-
A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1540, 1543 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment
for defendant on Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act claims), cer. denied, I11 S. Ct.
1313 (1991); Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1428 (11th Cir.
1990) (reversing summary judgment for defendant on Robinson-Patman claims); Has-
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7. Standing and Antitrust Injury
Conservative commentary frequently depicts private antitrust suits as
efficiency-reducing devices that serve largely to transfer economic rents
from one collection of economic actors to another.92 Accordingly, con-
servative doctrine would shrink the ability of firms to challenge their ri-
vals' conduct by imposing more stringent standing requirements93 and by
pressing plaintiffs to show a causal relationship between the alleged in-
jury and the anticompetitive features of the challenged conduct.94 This is
true, for example, for private challenges to mergers, where target firms or
rivals of the acquiring firm sometimes raise antitrust objections to pro-
posed transactions.95 The Reagan Justice Department played an aggres-
sive amicus role in attempting to persuade the Supreme Court to deny
standing in merger cases to firms that are rivals to the merging parties.
96
This survey applies a conservative classification to decisions that adopt
restrictive standing and antitrust injury requirements. 97
8. Evidentiary Standards
Liability rules and standing requirements are but two factors that
shape the outcome of antitrust disputes. Much depends on how courts
define the amount and types of evidence that will suffice to trigger the
application of liability rules.9" Supreme Court decisions such as Mon-
brouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding functional discount
to be Robinson-Patman violation), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990).
92. See W. Shughart II, Antitrust Policy and Interest-Group Politics 138-76 (1990);
Baumol & Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. L. & Econ. 247, 248-49
(1985).
93. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 35-37 (1984); Page,
The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1459-60 (1985).
94. See Page, supra note 4, at 1268-78.
95. See, e.g., R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1989)
(private antitrust suit brought by rival of the parties to the merger); Grumman Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1981) (private antitrust suit brought by merger
target).
96. See Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 952-53 (1987).
97. Examples of decisions classified as conservative include Mr. Furniture Ware-
house, Inc. v. Barclays Am./Commercial, Inc., 919 F.2d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)
(affirming judgment for defendant on standing grounds); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v.
Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 152 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (affirming judgment for
defendant on standing and antitrust injury grounds); The Tennessean Truckstop, Inc. v.
NTS, Inc., 875 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's suit on stand-
ing grounds). Examples of decisions classified as liberal include USA Petroleum Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff/competi-
tor's injury from defendant's vertical, nonpredatory maximum price-fixing constituted
antitrust injury), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E.
Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (allowing state to sue on behalf of
indirect purchasers to recover overcharges on cost-plus, fixed-quantity contracts), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988); Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724
F.2d 290, 297 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting defendant's antitrust standing arguments), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
98. See Page, supra note 4, at 1278-94.
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santo Co. v. Spray Rite Corp., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., X) and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electron-
ics Corp. "' have injected a permissive bias into antitrust jurisprudence by
increasing the burdens that plaintiffs must bear in conspiracy cases to
show that the challenged conduct resulted from collective, rather than
unilateral, conduct. The most conservative of these decisions is Matsu-
shita, which limits the inferences that may be derived from ambiguous
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and encourages summary dismissal
of allegations that are economically implausible. 02 For this survey, deci-
sions that use demanding evidentiary screens to eliminate antitrust
claims (including the dismissal of weak claims as early in the litigation
life cycle as possible) are treated as conservative. 0 3
9. State Action
State action matters pose difficult classification problems."° On the
one hand, some conservatives generally welcome aggressive judicial ef-
forts to undermine rent-seeking regulatory measures adopted by state
legislatures.105 By this logic, state action immunity should be narrowly
construed. On the other hand, conservatives who place a strong empha-
sis on federalism are reluctant to second-guess the judgments of state
legislatures and regulatory bodies, even when such judgments reduce
consumer welfare. This Article gives a conservative classification to
votes that favor a narrow reach for the state action doctrine and entertain
99. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
100. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
101. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
102. See DeSanti & Kovacic, Matsushita. Its Construction and Application by the
Lower Courts, 59 Antitrust L.J. 609, 610 (1991).
103. Examples of decisions classified as conservative include Parkway Gallery Furni-
ture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pernsylvania House Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 801, 806 (4th Cir.
1989) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on conspiracy issue); Culberson, Inc.
v. Interstate Elec. Co., 821 F.2d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Illinois Corporate
Travel v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1986) (circumstantial evi-
dence of agreement deemed inadequate to exclude possibility that defendant acted inde-
pendently). Examples of decisions classified as liberal include Arizona v. Standard Oil
Co., 906 F.2d 432, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment for defendants;
ruling that jury may permissibly infer illegal price-fixing agreement based upon evidence
of parallel pricing together with evidence that defendants individually announced price
increases in hope that rivals also would raise prices), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991);
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 823 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1987) (evidence of independ-
ent business justification deemed insufficient to preclude inference of unlawful conspir-
acy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988); Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes
Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1536 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant; evidence held sufficient to establish illegal resale price maintenance
agreement).
104. The state action doctrine confers antitrust immunity upon the conduct of public
and private entities when such conduct is authorized and monitored by the state. For a
recent comprehensive discussion and evaluation of the state action doctrine, see Elhauge,
The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1991).
105. See R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
263-82 (1986).
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probing efforts to limit the reach of anticompetitive legislation and regu-
lation at the state and local levels of government. 1°6 This Article sepa-
rately reports the results of state action decisions and other cases
involving antitrust immunities.
10. Other Immunities
The Noerr and state action immunities are two of the most important
elements of a larger set of legislatively and judicially devised dispensa-
tions from the antitrust statutes. Among other areas, Congress has cre-
ated express exemptions for certain activities of organized labor 10 7 and a
variety of industries such as insurance.108 Courts have recognized non-
statutory immunities, such as the act of state doctrine," and in rare
instances have dismissed antitrust claims on the ground that the compre-
hensiveness of an alternative federal regulatory scheme creates an im-
plied exemption from the antitrust laws.'" °
Like the Noerr and state action cases, decisions involving other immu-
nity claims resist easy classification as liberal or conservative. A con-
servative judge might regard statutory exemptions unfavorably as the
products of successful interest group rent-seeking, but the same judge
may be wary of upsetting legislative judgments that such exemptions are
appropriate. This Article treats as conservative votes that support nar-
row interpretation and application of statutory and non-statutory immu-
106. Examples of decisions classified as conservative include cases such as Omni Out-
door Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 891 F.2d 1127, 1137 (4th
Cir. 1989) (municipality not entitled to state action immunity where its actions came
within scope of conspiracy exception), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991); United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1983) (col-
lective rate-setting did not fall within state action exemption to federal antitrust laws),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Ronwin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1982)
(challenged bar examination grading procedure failed to qualify for antitrust immunity as
state action), rev'd sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). Examples of deci-
sions classified as liberal include cases such as New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v.
FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1077 (1st Cir. 1990) (bureau's supervision of motor carrier rates was
sufficiently active for state action immunity from antitrust liability); Obendorf v. City and
County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1439 (10th Cir.) (state action immunity from antitrust
liability applied to action taken by city pursuant to Colorado urban renewal law), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 232 (3d Cir.
1987) (county officials immune from antitrust liability when authorized by state policy to
limit dumping at local landfill to trash generated within county).
107. For a discussion of the statutory bases of organized labor's antitrust exemption,
see Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1379, 1389-90
(1988).
108. See, eg., Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63
Tul. L. Rev. 999, 1016-21 (1989) (discussing statutory foundation for and interpretation
of insurance industry's antitrust exemption).
109. The act of state doctrine precludes antitrust courts from entertaining claims that
rest upon the asserted invalidity of an official act of a foreign sovereign. See I P. Areeda
& D. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
39 (1978).
110. See id. at 4c-224f.
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nities. 11" Because immunity cases pose especially problematic
classification issues, votes in these matters are segregated and reported
separately.
11. Summary
In comparing Carter and Reagan appointee voting on the federal
courts of appeals, this Article defines as conservative votes that view the
following behavior permissively: single-firm conduct (except exclusion
by manipulation of government instrumentalities), shared monopoliza-
tion, market signalling, vertical restraints, mergers (except horizontal
transactions involving especially large market shares), and price discrimi-
nation. Horizontal restraints adopted as part of efficiency-enhancing in-
tegrations warrant rule of reason analysis, and only "naked" horizontal
restraints (such as price-fixing on highway construction contracts) are to
be condemned by a per se test. Standing and antitrust injury screens are
to be applied rigorously, and plaintiffs must fulfill strict evidentiary re-
quirements to establish liability prerequisites such as the existence of col-
lective action in Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy cases. As a whole,
these prescriptions reflect the conservative view that antitrust doctrine
should attack only conduct whose effect, examined through the lens of
price theory, unmistakably harms allocative efficiency. Behavior with
procompetitive, neutral, or ambiguous efficiency consequences should be
ignored. 112
This Article also confers conservative status upon votes that construe
antitrust immunities narrowly. Thus, a conservative perspective takes a
skeptical view of the state action and Noerr immunity arguments, as well
as defenses premised upon other federal antitrust exemptions that toler-
ate conduct otherwise forbidden by the antitrust laws. Because immu-
nity cases present issues that often defy meaningful classification on a
liberal-conservative spectrum, the Article separately reports the results of
non-immunity and immunity decisions, respectively.
111. Examples of immunity decisions classified as conservative in this Article include
cases such as Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 336 (9th Cir. 1990)(rejecting immunity defense based on Agricultural Adjustment Act); Environmental Tec-
tonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting immunity
based on act of state doctrine), aff'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v.
City of Pontiac, 666 F.2d 1029, 1033 (6th Cir. 1981) (rejecting implied immunity defense
based on National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974). Examples
of immunity decisions classified as liberal include Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n,
884 F.2d 524, 530 (10th Cir. 1989) (defendant's conduct immune on basis of Amateur
Sports Act), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1947 (1990); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809
F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendant's conduct immunized by legislative labor exemp-
tion); National Gerimedical & Gerontological Hosp. Corp. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
628 F.2d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1980) (defendant's conduct immunized by National Health
Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974), rev'd, 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
112. See, e-g., R_ Bork, supra note 61, at 133 (courts and antitrust enforcement agen-
cies should follow policy of "nonintervention" when "changes seem roughly equal that
the activity is beneficial or harmful"); Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 1282 (antitrust enforce-
ment agencies should abide by principle of "primo non nocere-first do no harm").
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C. Survey Results: Broad Perspective
This Article places relevant cases from the 1977-1990 period into four
categories. The first considers all non-immunity votes cast by Carter and
Reagan appointees and determines how frequently Carter judges and
Reagan judges embraced positions that coincided with conservative anti-
trust preferences. The second consists of non-immunity cases in which
either a Carter appointee or a Reagan appointee authored the majority
opinion. The third category consists of all non-immunity cases in which
at least one Carter appointee and at least one Reagan appointee sat on
the same panel. The fourth category consists of all cases whose resolu-
tion depended chiefly upon the treatment of immunity defenses.
1. All Votes Cast by Carter and Reagan Appointees in Non-
Immunity Cases
Of the 897 cases chosen for detailed study during the survey period,
751 were non-immunity decisions. In the 751 non-immunity decisions,
Carter and Reagan appointees cast a total of 1296 votes. This total in-
cludes all votes cast by Carter and Reagan appointees in the following
forms: majority opinions, votes cast in support of the majority outcome,
votes cast in per curiam decisions, concurring opinions, dissenting opin-
ions, votes cast in support of dissenting opinions, and votes cast in deci-
sions en banc.113 These votes also include cases in which more than one
Carter or Reagan appointee sat on the same panel. For example, if two
Carter appointees participated on a panel in the same case, the vote of
each was treated as a separate observable event.
Carter appointees accounted for 809 of the total of 1296 votes. In 249
instances (30.8 percent), Carter appointees supported liberal outcomes.
In 560 instances (69.2 percent), Carter judges endorsed outcomes consis-
tent with a conservative antitrust agenda. Reagan appointees cast 487 of
the 1296 votes. In 86 of these instances (17.7 percent), Reagan appoin-
113. The survey treats votes cast on a three-judge panel and in an en banc proceeding
in the same matter as separately measurable events. Where an opinion has been pub-
lished, withdrawn, modified, and republished, the survey counts only the final, repub-
lished opinion as an observable event. For example, the survey counts Judge Posner's
votes in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), and Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488 (three-judge panel), vacated, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), but it excludes Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), which was withdrawn and re-
placed by the opinion published at 706 F.2d 1488. The survey also omits votes in en banc
decisions in which the sole basis for the request for rehearing en banc was an asserted
deficiency in the three-judge panel's treatment of a non-antitrust issue of evidence or
procedure. For example, the survey omits Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 1986-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 7,271 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (en banc), in which the sole issue before the
court was the original panel's affirmance of the trial court's refusal to admit a witness's
testimony and notarized written statement. The en banc panel's disposition of the issue
hinged entirely upon its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at
61,383.
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tees supported liberal outcomes. In 401 instances (82.3 percent), Reagan
judges endorsed outcomes consistent with a conservative antitrust
agenda. Thus, Reagan appointees adhered to conservative antitrust posi-
tions more frequently (82.3 percent of all non-immunity votes versus 69.2
percent) than their Carter counterparts.
2. Majority Opinions Authored by Carter and Reagan Appointees in
Non-Immunity Cases
In the 751 non-immunity cases selected for detailed study, Carter or
Reagan appointees wrote the majority opinion in 419 cases. Of these,
Carter appointees authored the majority opinion in 260 cases. In 60 of
the 260 cases (34.6 percent), Carter appointees issued opinions that em-
braced liberal doctrines. In the remaining 170 cases (65.4 percent),
Carter appointees adopted positions consistent with a conservative anti-
trust agenda. Reagan authors of majority opinions adhered to the con-
servative agenda more frequently. Reagan appointees authored 159
opinions and took liberal positions in 26 cases (16.4 percent). In the re-
maining 134 opinions (83.6 percent), Reagan appointees endorsed con-
servative outcomes.
3. Votes Cast When Carter and Reagan Appointees Sat on the Same
Panel in Non-Immunity Cases
Of the 751 non-immunity cases chosen for detailed review, 184 were
decided by panels containing at least one Carter appointee and one Rea-
gan appointee. In 160 cases featuring joint participation (87 percent),
Carter and Reagan judges favored the same outcome. In 21 of the6agreement" cases (13.1 percent), Carter and Reagan appointees adopted
liberal positions. In the remaining 139 agreement cases (86.9 percent),
Carter and Reagan judges endorsed conservative outcomes. Carter ap-
pointees and Reagan appointees disagreed in seventeen cases involving
joint participation in which no Carter or Reagan appointee voted with a
judge appointed by the other president. In fifteen of these cases, Reagan
appointees preferred conservative outcomes, and Carter judges endorsed
liberal results."'1 In two instances, Carter appointees supported a con-
114. See Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1989) (major-
ity opinion by Reagan appointee Chapman; dissent by Carter appointee Sprouse), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1120 (1990); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902
(majority consisting of Reagan appointees Baldock and Moore; dissent by Carter ap-
pointee McKay), supplemented, 881 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
837 (1990); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (majority
opinion by Carter appointee Newman; dissent by Reagan appointee Altimari), amended,
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988)
(majority consisting of Carter appointees Boochever and Pregerson; dissent by Reagan
appointee Beezer); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (major-
ity consisting of Reagan appointees Starr and Williams; dissent by Carter appointee
Mikva); Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1987) (majority including Reagan appointee Garwood, dissent by Carter appointee
Rubin); Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 811 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.) (majority
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servative outcome, and Reagan judges supported a liberal result."I5
In addition to the seventeen decisions involving a complete division
between Carter and Reagan appointees, there were seven cases in which
at least one Carter judge and one Reagan judge disagreed, but at least
one Carter or Reagan judge also endorsed the views of a judge appointed
by the other president. Three of these decisions endorsed liberal out-
comes,1 6 and four decisions adopted conservative positions.' 7 As a fur-
ther point of comparison, there were eleven instances in which Carter
and Reagan judges did not sit on the same panel and judges appointed by
the same president disagreed with each other. Nine of these decisions
featured disagreement among Carter appointees, with six cases support-
consisting of Carter appointees Canby and Reinhardt, dissent by Reagan appointee Noo-
nan), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th
Cir. 1986) (majority opinion by Carter appointee Cudahy; dissent by Reagan appointee
Easterbrook); Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1985) (majority including Carter appointee Arnold; dissent by Reagan appointee Fagg);
Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1985)
(majority including Reagan appointee Contie; dissent by Carter appointee Kennedy); Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (ma-
jority opinion by Carter appointee Ferguson; dissent by Reagan appointee Beezer);
Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (majority opinion by Reagan
appointee Jolly; dissent by Carter appointee Tate); Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (majority including Reagan appointees Fagg and Gibson; dissent by
Carter appointees Arnold and McMillian), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Roesch, Inc.
v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 926 (1984); Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (majority
including Carter appointee Politz; dissent by Reagan appointee Jolly).
115. See United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 809 F.2d 480 (8th Cir.) (majority includ-
ing Carter appointee McMillian; dissent by Reagan appointee Bowman), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 822 (1987); Trans Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 766 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1985)
(majority opinion by Carter appointee Farris; dissent by Reagan appointee Beezer), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
116. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (major-
ity including Carter appointees Friedman and Smith and Reagan appointee Mayer; dis-
sent by Reagan appointee Newman), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989); Illinois ex reL
Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (majority
including Carter appointee Cudahy and Reagan appointees Coffey, Flaum, Kanne, Pos-
ner, and Ripple; dissent joined by Reagan appointee Manion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986
(1988); Guzowski v. Hartman, 849 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1988) (majority consisting of
Carter appointee Merritt and Reagan appointee Nelson; dissent by Reagan appointee
Krupansky).
117. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (majority including Carter appointee Alarcon and Reagan appointees
Beezer, Brunetti, Noonan, O'Scannlain, and Wiggins; dissent by Carter appointee Norris
and Reagan appointees Kozinski and Thompson); The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc.,
849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) (majority consisting of Carter appointee Alarcon and Rea-
gan appointee Thompson; dissent by Carter appointee Reinhardt); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.) (majority consisting of Carter
appointee Merritt and Reagan appointee Wellford; dissent by Carter appointee Martin),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (majority including Reagan appointees
Coffey, Flaum, and Posner; dissent by Carter appointee Cudahy and Reagan appointee
Eschbach), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
[Vol. 60
RFAGAN'S JUDICIAL APPOINTEES
ing liberal outcomes"1 ' and three cases endorsing conservative results." 9
Two decisions involved disagreement between Reagan appointees, with
both cases yielding liberal results.12
The data presented above suggest qualifications to conclusions that
might be drawn from a review of aggregate voting data. Without more
decisions revealing intra-panel disagreement between Carter and Reagan
appointees, it is difficult to predict whether Carter or Reagan judges will
endorse or reject positions adopted by their counterparts on panels con-
sisting of judges selected by the other president. The frequency with
which Carter and Reagan appointees agreed when participating in the
same case (160 cases out of 184) could stem from a number of sources.
Common voting on mixed panels could indicate an underlying similarity
of ideological perspectives. Such votes also could be attributable to the
persuasive influence of individual judges in marshalling support for spe-
cific outcomes. Finally, common outcomes could result from internal
institutional forces-for example, the need to sustain and build coalitions
for voting on future cases-that favor consensus and disincline individual
judges to dissent except in instances of extreme disagreement. 2 On the
118. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988)
(majority consisting of Carter appointees Reinhardt and Nelson; dissent by Carter ap-
pointee Alarcon), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v.
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983) (majority consisting
of Carter appointees Boochever and Ferguson; dissent by Carter appointee Norris), rev'd,
472 U.S. 284 (1985); Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983)
(majority consisting of Carter appointees Boochever and Ferguson; dissent by Carter ap-
pointee Norris); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982) (majority including
Carter appointee Jones; dissent by Carter appointee Kennedy), vacated, 461 U.S. 940
(1983); Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981) (majority consist-
ing of Carter appointees Jones and Keith; dissent by Carter appointee Merritt); May
Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (majority including
Carter appointee Hug; dissent by Carter appointee Skopil).
119. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (1989) (majority including Carter
appointee Hatchett; dissent by Carter appointee Clark), amended, 893 F.2d 293 (1 1th
Cir.), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 401 (1990) (per curiam); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
Abbott Laboratories, 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981) (majority consisting of Carter appoin-
tees Frank Johnson and Vance; dissent by Carter appointee Clark), rev'd, 460 U.S. 150
(1983); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (majority opinion by
Carter appointee Ruth Ginsburg, dissent by Carter appointee Mkva).
120. See Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988)
(majority including Reagan appointee Coffey; dissent by Reagan appointee Posner), cert.
denied, 110 S. CL 141 (1989); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786
F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986) (majority opinion by Reagan appointee Mansmann- dissent by
Reagan appointee Becker).
121. In their study of voting behavior on three-judge federal appellate panels, Profes-
sors Richardson and Vines concluded that "Itihe intrinsic loneliness of dissent on the
circuits may well act as a deterrent to a single judge who faces the possibility of lone
disagreement with the majority ofjudges." Richardson & Vines, Review, Dissent and the
Appellate Proces" A Political Interpretation, 29 J. Pol. 597, 611 (1967); cf. Arthur, Work-
able Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 Tul. L Rev. 1163, 1216
(1988) ("In large measure, their shared sense of the traditional judicial role provides the
self-discipline-and peer pressure for those lacking that quality--that enables federal
judges of varying political and social beliefs to render consistent decisions according to
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whole, the data on mixed panel voting provide qualified support for the
hypothesis that Reagan judges are more disposed to vote conservatively
in antitrust matters than Carter judges.
The incidence of disagreement between judges appointed by the same
president-eleven instances of intra-Carter or intra-Reagan disagreement
involving panels with no judges appointed by the other president, and
seven instances of intra-Carter or intra-Reagan disagreement on panels
including judges appointed by the other president-suggests caution in
evaluating hypotheses that attribute single-minded, monolithic voting
preferences to appointees of either President Carter or President Reagan.
Viewed one way, the number of cases involving some degree of intra-
appointee disagreement (eighteen) is greater than the number of cases
involving a clean division between Carter and Reagan judges participat-
ing in the same matter (seventeen). As explored in more detail below,122
aggregate voting data tends to mask important disparities in preferences
among judges appointed by the same president. The data do not support
the hypothesis that either President Carter or President Reagan ap-
pointed judges with wholly likeminded antitrust views.
4. Votes Cast by Carter and Reagan Appointees in Immunity Cases
Of the 897 cases chosen for detailed study, 146 were decided mainly on
the basis of immunity issues such as the interpretation of statutory ex-
emptions and the application of the Noerr, state action, and act-of-state
doctrines. Carter appointees cast 161 votes in these matters, supporting
liberal results 103 times (64.0 percent) and conservative outcomes 58
times (36.0 percent). Out of 112 total votes, Reagan judges cast 72 lib-
eral votes (64.3 percent) and 40 conservative votes (35.7 percent). Thus,
overall voting patterns in antitrust immunity cases suggest that Carter
and Reagan appointees hold similar views concerning the proper scope of
legislatively- and judicially- conceived dispensations from the antitrust
laws.
Carter and Reagan judges participated on the same panel in 42 immu-
nity cases. In 35 instances (83.3 percent), Carter and Reagan appointees
reached agreement, endorsing liberal outcomes 24 times (68.6 percent)
and conservative outcomes 11 times (31.4 percent). Four disagreement
cases featured a complete division between Carter and Reagan judges,
with Carter appointees favoring conservative outcomes and Reagan
judges supporting liberal results. 123 Three additional disagreement cases
law rather than personal belief."). For comprehensive discussions of collegial decision-
making processes that diminish the likelihood of dissent in individual cases decided by
appellate courts, see R. Carp & R. Stidham, supra note 18, at 171-96; J. Howard, Jr.,
supra note 18, at 189-221; W. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 56-58 (1964).
122. See infra notes 146-290 and accompanying text.
123. See Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising Inc., 891
F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989) (majority opinion by Carter appointee Sprouse; dissent by Rea-
gan appointee Wilkins), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991); Barton's Disposal Serv., Inc. v.
Tiger Corp., 886 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1989) (majority including Carter appointee Sam
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involved a split between at least one Carter appointee and one Reagan
appointee but also had a judge appointed by one president supporting the
position of a judge chosen by the other president.12' The immunity case
data set also contained four decisions in which Carter and Reagan ap-
pointees did not sit together and in which judges appointed by the same
president disagreed.1 25
II. VOTING BEHAVIOR BY CARTER AND REAGAN APPOINTEES:
NARROW PERSPECTIVE
A second way to consider the significance of judicial appointments is
to examine voting behavior in the context of discrete sets of cases dealing
with significant fields of antitrust law. This method can assist in de-
tecting differences in judicial policy preferences in areas in which liberals
and conservatives have articulated well-defined, competing visions of ap-
propriate antitrust rules. This section describes Carter and Reagan ap-
pointee voting behavior in six areas: predatory pricing, mergers, vertical
restraints, tying, price discrimination, and standing/antitrust injury.
Johnson; dissent by Reagan appointee Davis); Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313 (6th
Cir. 1986) (majority opinion by Reagan appointee Wellford; dissent by Carter appointee
Merritt), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1035 (1987); North Carolina ex reL Edmisten v. P.I.A.
Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (majority including Carter appoin-
tees Ervin, Murnaghan, Phillips, and Sprouse; dissent including Reagan appointee Chap-
man), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
124. One of the three cases reached a liberal outcome. See Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v.
Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 793 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (major-
ity including Carter appointees Boochever, Canby, Fletcher, Norris, Pregerson, and
Reinhardt; dissent by Carter appointee Alarcon and Reagan appointees Brunetti and
Wiggins), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987). Two cases endorsed conservative results.
See Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990) (en
bane) (majority including Carter appointees Anderson and Hatchett and Reagan appoin-
tees Cox and Edmondson; dissent by Carter appointees Johnson and Kravitch), vacated,
111 S. Ct. 1300 (1991); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th
Cir. 1984) (en bane) (majority including Carter appointees Garza, Sam Johnson, Politz,
Rubin, and Tate and Reagan appointee Higginbotham; dissent by Carter appointee
Reavley and including Reagan appointee Jolly), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
125. Three cases involved disagreement among Carter appointees. One case endorsed
a liberal outcome. See Hass v. Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989) (majority
opinion by Carter appointee Alarcon; dissent by Carter appointee Ferguson), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1812 (1990). Two decisions reached conservative results. See United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(majority including Carter appointees Hatchett, Henderson, Frank Johnson, Kravitch,
and Vance; dissent including Carter appointees Anderson and Clark), rev'd, 471 U.S. 48
(1985); Ronwin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982) (majority including
Carter appointee Boochever; dissent by Carter appointee Ferguson), rev'd sub nom. Hoo-
ver v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). One case involved disagreement between two Rea-
gan appointees and reached a conservative result. See Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-
Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988) (majority opinion by
Reagan appointee Jolly; dissent by Reagan appointee Garwood), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
906 (1989).
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A. Predatory Pricing
Since the mid-1970s, predatory pricing litigation has become a promi-
nent battleground for competing views about the proper role of antitrust
in controlling dominant firm conduct. 126 Academic commentators have
generated a massive literature on predatory pricing,' 27 while federal
judges since 1975 have published numerous decisions128 dealing with
predatory pricing claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 29 or Sec-
tion 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act. 3 ' Like the academic literature,
judicial opinions have featured an active debate about the choice of pre-
dation standards.'
During the survey period for this Article, Carter and Reagan appoin-
tees to the courts of appeals participated in 53 cases involving predatory
pricing allegations. Carter judges cast a total of 53 votes in these cases.
The Carter judges endorsed liberal results in 16 instances (30.2 percent)
and supported conservative outcomes 37 times (69.8 percent). Reagan
judges cast 36 votes, taking liberal positions 7 times (19.4 percent) and
adopting conservative approaches in 29 instances (80.6 percent). Reagan
and Carter judges sat on the same panel in 14 cases and reached agree-
ment 12 times. Twelve agreement decisions reached conservative out-
comes, and two favored liberal results. In the two disagreement cases,
Carter appointees uniformly favored liberal positions, and Reagan ap-
pointees, with the exception of one vote, advocated conservative views.' 32
126. The modem era of predatory pricing analysis and doctrine can be defined by ref-
erence to publication of Philip Areeda's and Donald Turner's marginal cost pricing stan-
dard. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
127. For summaries of the modern legal and economic commentary, see Ordover &
Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organiza-
tion 537 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds. 1989); Baker, Recent Developments in Eco-
nomics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 Antitrust L.J. 645, 648-49 (1989);
Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of
Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 738 (1981); Calvani & Lynch, Predatory Pricing
Under the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts" An Introduction, 51 Antitrust L.J. 375
(1982); Hurwitz & Kovacie, supra note 7, at 66-83; Larson & Kovacic, Predatory Pricing
Safeguards in Telecommunications Regulation: Removing Impediments to Competition,
35 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 4-8, 30-36 (1990).
128. One article counted 119 published predatory pricing decisions from 1975 through
August 1990. See Larson & Kovacic, supra note 127, at 19.
129. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopoliza-
tion, and conspiracies to monopolize. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
130. Section 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination "where the
effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly." See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
131. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 1.1-721 (Supp. 1990).
132. One disagreement decision featured a clean split according to the appointing pres-
ident. See Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (majority consisting
of Reagan appointees Davis and Jolly; dissent by Carter appointee Tate). The second
disagreement case arrayed two Carter appointees and a Reagan appointee against another
Reagan appointee. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (majority consisting of Carter appointees Friedman and Smith and Reagan ap-
[Vol. 60
REA GAN'S JUDICIAL APPOINTEES
B. Mergers
The Reagan presidency featured a substantial, controversial retrench-
ment of federal merger control activity and expansive efforts to persuade
the antitrust community to embrace less restrictive antimerger stan-
dards. "' Voting behavior in cases involving public or private challenges
to mergers provides a useful arena in which to measure the strength of
liberal and conservative antitrust preferences. Of all subsets in the non-
immunity case data base, merger matters generated the greatest disparity
in aggregate voting behavior between Carter and Reagan appointees.
During the survey period, Carter and Reagan judges participated in 35
merger cases. Carter appointees cast 29 votes in these matters. Twenty-
one Carter votes (72.4 percent) supported liberal outcomes, and eight
votes (27.6 percent) adopted conservative positions. Reagan appointees
cast 32 merger votes, with ten votes (31.3 percent) endorsing liberal
views and 22 votes (68.7 percent) favoring conservative results. Carter
and Reagan appointees participated on the same panel in seven merger
cases. Five cases produced agreement and conservative outcomes."o
The two disagreement cases produced liberal outcomes, with Carter
judges favoring the liberal results and a Reagan appointee dissenting in
both instances. 13 5
pointee Mayer, dissent by Reagan appointee Newman), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1068
(1989).
133. See, e.g., Axinn, Developments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 58 Antitrust L. 403,
419 (1989) ("In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal antitrust cops were out patrolling their
beat .... Then, in the 1980s the cops retreated into the station house .... The prevail-
ing view was that a little crime wouldn't hurt and probably was good for business.");
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 1805, 1809 (1990) ("The 1980s witnessed a radical relaxation of government en-
forcement in the merger area."); Schmalensee, Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and
Changes, 1 J. Econ. Perspectives 41, 45-47 (1987) (discussing Reagan Administration's
proposed amendments to the Clayton Act's antimerger provision); Task Force Report,
supra note 84, at 757-62 (discussing Department of Justice merger enforcement policy in
the 1980s).
134. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(majority consisting of Bush appointee Thomas, Carter appointee Ruth Ginsburg, and
Reagan appointee Sentelle); California v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 840, 846
(9th Cir. 1989) (majority including Carter appointee Poole and Reagan appointee
O'Scannlain), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990); FTC v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 853
F.2d 458, 465 (6th Cir. 1988) (majority including Carter appointee Merritt and Reagan
appointee Boggs), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1015 (1989); FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d
1500, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (majority consisting of Carter appointee Wald and Reagan
appointees Bork and Starr); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 781 F.2d
1224 (6th Cir. 1986) (majority including Carter appointee Keith and Reagan appointee
Milburn).
135. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (majority in-
cluding Carter appointee Newman; dissent by Reagan appointee Altimari), amended, 890
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988) (major-
ity consisting of Carter appointees Boochever and Ferguson; dissent by Reagan appointee
Beezer).
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C. Vertical Restraints Excluding Tying
Vertical restraints cases other than tying disputes accounted for 123
cases-the largest subset of cases within the non-immunity data base of
751 decisions. Carter appointees cast 130 votes in these cases; 36 votes
(27.7 percent) adopted liberal positions, and 94 votes (72.3 percent) em-
braced conservative perspectives. Reagan appointees endorsed liberal
outcomes in a notably lower percentage of their votes in vertical re-
straints matters. Reagan judges cast 75 vertical restraints votes, taking
liberal positions six times (8 percent) and endorsing conservative out-
comes 69 times (92 percent).
Carter and Reagan judges sat on the same panel in 24 vertical re-
straints cases. Nineteen joint participation cases yielded agreement
among Carter and Reagan appointees, with two cases endorsing liberal
outcomes and seventeen decisions supporting conservative results.
Carter and Reagan appointees disagreed in five vertical restraints cases.
Four cases produced a complete division among Carter and Reagan
judges, with Carter judges endorsing liberal positions and Reagan judges
advocating conservative outcomes.1 3 6 In the fifth disagreement case, a
Carter judge dissented from a conservative position adopted by a Reagan
appointee and a Carter appointee1 37
D. Tying
Carter and Reagan appointees participated in 70 tying cases during the
survey period. Carter appointees cast 75 votes in these matters, support-
ing liberal results nineteen times (25.3 percent) and conservative out-
comes 56 times (74.7 percent). Reagan appointees cast 31 votes in tying
cases and largely mirrored the voting patterns of their Carter counter-
parts. Reagan judges supported liberal outcomes seven times (22.6 per-
cent) and endorsed conservative positions 24 times (77.4 percent). Carter
and Reagan judges sat on the same panel in twelve cases and agreed in
each instance. Two of the agreement decisions yielded liberal outcomes,
and the remaining ten supported conservative results. There were two
additional cases featuring disagreement among judges appointed by the
136. See Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1985)
(majority including Carter appointee Arnold; dissent by Reagan appointee Fagg); Battle
v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (majority including Reagan appoin-
tees Fagg and Gibson; dissent by Carter appointee McMillian with Arnold joining), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir.
1983) (en bane) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,
709 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (majority including Carter appointee Politz; dissent by
Reagan appointee Jolly).
137. See The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) (major-
ity consisting of Carter appointee Alarcon and Reagan appointee Thompson; dissent by
Carter appointee Reinhardt). The vertical restraints data subset also included one deci-
sion featuring disagreement between two Reagan appointees. See Arnold Pontiac-GMC,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986) (liberal majority including
Reagan appointee Mansmann; conservative dissent by Reagan appointee Becker).
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same president.138
E. Price Discrimination
Carter and Reagan appointees participated in 48 cases that dealt
mainly with price discrimination claims arising under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. Carter appointees cast 56 votes in these cases, adopting liberal
positions 22 times (39.3 percent) and supporting conservative views 34
times (60.7 percent). Aggregate Reagan appointee voting data in price
discrimination cases suggest a greater conservatism. Reagan judges cast
29 votes, reaching liberal results eight times (27.5 percent) and favoring
conservative outcomes 21 times (72.4 percent).
Carter and Reagan judges sat on the same panel in twelve price dis-
crimination cases. Seven of these cases featured agreement, with three
decisions favoring liberal outcomes and four decisions endorsing con-
servative results. Five cases featured a complete division among Carter
and Reagan judges, with Carter judges invariably favoring liberal out-
comes and Reagan judges invariably supporting conservative posi-
tions. 13 9  Two additional cases yielded disagreement among Carter
appointees."14
F. Standing and Antitrust Injury
Seventy-one cases in the non-immunity data set hinged chiefly on the
resolution of standing or antitrust injury issues. Carter appointees cast
74 votes in these cases, endorsing liberal outcomes 22 times (29.7 per-
cent) and conservative results 52 times (70.3 percent). Reagan judges
voted conservatively somewhat more often in casting 60 votes in standing
and antitrust injury matters. Reagan appointees supported liberal posi-
tions 14 times (23.3 percent) and favored conservative outcomes 46 times
(76.7 percent). Carter and Reagan judges jointly participated in 22
138. See Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988)
(liberal majority including Reagan appointee Coffey; conservative dissent by Reagan ap-
pointee Posner), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 141 (1989); Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660
F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981) (liberal majority consisting of Carter appointees Jones and
Keith; conservative dissent by Carter appointee Merritt).
139. See Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1989) (major-
ity opinion by Reagan appointee Chapman; dissent by Carter appointee Sprouse), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1120 (1990); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (majority consisting of Reagan appointees Starr and Williams; dissent by Carter
appointee Mikva); Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129(5th Cir. 1987) (majority including Reagan appointee Garwood, dissent by Carter ap-
pointee Rubin); Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214
(6th Cir. 1985) (majority including Reagan appointee Contie; dissent by Carter appointee
Kennedy); Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (majority opinion by
Reagan appointee Jolly; dissent by Carter appointee Tate).
140. See Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 656
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981) (conservative majority including Carter appointees Frank John-
son and Vance; liberal dissent by Carter appointee Clark), rey'd, 460 U.S. 150 (1983);
May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (liberal majority
including Carter appointee Hug; conservative dissent by Carter appointee Skopil).
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standing cases. Twenty cases yielded agreement, with two decisions sup-
porting liberal outcomes and eighteen decisions reaching conservative re-
sults. The two disagreement decisions did not present a clean division
between Carter and Reagan judges.141 Two additional standing/antitrust
injury cases featured disagreement among judges appointed by the same
president. 
142
III. THE RESULTS INTERPRETED: QUALITATIVE FEATURES
The data on the voting behavior of Carter and Reagan appointees in
non-immunity decisions are generally consistent with the hypothesis that
Reagan judges have more conservative antitrust preferences than their
Carter counterparts. Reagan judges cast conservative votes more often
than Carter judges as a percentage of all non-immunity votes (82.3 per-
cent versus 69.2 percent). Voting patterns in specific non-immunity sub-
stantive areas suggest that Reagan appointees are decidedly more
inclined than Carter judges to cast conservative votes in vertical re-
straints cases (92 percent versus 72.3 percent) and merger cases (68.7
percent versus 27.6 percent). Although there are comparatively few in-
stances of disagreement between Carter and Reagan judges participating
in the same matter, Reagan judges adhered to conservative positions in
such cases considerably more often than their Carter colleagues.
43
As suggested above, caution is appropriate in interpreting the aggre-
gate voting data. One cannot be sure how an individual judge would
have voted if confronted by facts evaluated by another panel in a case in
which she did not participate. Cases involving joint Carter-Reagan ap-
pointee participation in some subsets of cases-for example, the immu-
nity case data set and the predatory pricing, tying, and standing/
antitrust injury case data sets-presented no or few instances of disagree-
ment between Carter and Reagan judges. Although voting in cases fea-
turing disagreement suggests greater Reagan appointee conservatism,
one cannot assume automatically that one set of judges would have
reached different outcomes had they participated in other cases con-
tained in the data set.
Three other considerations, discussed below, require qualification of
141. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (conservative majority including Carter appointee Alarcon and Reagan
appointees Beezer, Brunetti, Noonan, O'Scannlain, and Wiggins; dissent by Carter ap-
pointee Norris and Reagan appointees Kozinski and Thompson); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan
v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (liberal majority includ-
ing Carter appointee Cudahy and Reagan appointees Coffey, Flaum, Kanne, Posner, and
Ripple; dissent joined by Reagan appointee Manion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
142. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988)
(liberal majority consisting of Carter appointees Nelson and Reinhardt; dissent by Carter
appointee Alarcon), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co.,
715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983) (majority consisting of Carter appointees Boochever and
Ferguson; dissent by Carter appointee Norris).
143. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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the aggregate voting data. The first caveat is that the relatively greater
frequency of Carter appointee support for liberal antitrust outcomes
tends to understate how extensively some Carter appointees have em-
braced conservative analytical approaches. Indeed, in a noteworthy
number of instances, individual Carter appointees have accumulated an-
titrust voting records that match or exceed the conservatism of promi-
nent Reagan appointees such as Richard Posner. This phenomenon is
neither accidental nor surprising, as it flows from the guidance all court
of appeals judges have received from the Supreme Court and academia-
two institutions whose antitrust preferences have narrowed substantially
over the past twenty years. Conservative voting tendencies also reflect
economic and political change that has increased concern about regula-
tory programs that reduce the competitive strength of American firms.
The second caveat is that Reagan judges have not been as singlemind-
edly predisposed to reject antitrust claims as proponents of the conserva-
tive court-packing hypothesis have suggested. As some observers have
predicted, 1" there is evidence that at least a small subset of Reagan ap-
pointees have moderately expansive antitrust preferences. Further exam-
ination of the cases reviewed in this survey also reveals that the
"conservatism" often associated with Reagan judicial appointees takes
several forms, some of which do not entail a narrow conception or appli-
cation of antitrust liability standards. One dimension of conservatism is
a refusal by some Reagan appointees to displace comparatively expansive
legal precedent with new standards based upon analytical precepts that
disfavor intervention. Even for economically-oriented Reagan judges,
adherence to Chicago School views145 sometimes may generate pro-plain-
tiff outcomes that the conservative court-packing hypothesis would not
predict.
The third caveat is that the data do not reflect the qualitative signifi-
cance of some Reagan appointees. The opinions of judges such as Robert
Bork (until his departure from the bench), Frank Easterbrook, Richard
144. See Wermiel, Some Reagan Judicial Appointees Fail to Follow Conservative Path
Expected by Administration, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1988, at 66, col. 1; see also Sullivan,
Comment, in Private Antitrust Litigation 381, 383 (S. Salop & L White eds. 1988)
("[T]here are some new court of appeals judges and several new district court judges who
might well be described as conservative populists-people who value small business, wide
dispersion of economic power, and the tradition of local control.").
145. Chicago School teaching forms the principal basis for the policy views embodied
in the conservative agenda that this Article uses to classify votes as liberal or conserva-
tive. See supra notes 56-112 and accompanying text. As summarized by Judge Easter-
brook, the Chicago School "seems to favor little other than prosecuting plain vanilla
cartels and mergers to monopoly. Its adherents are reasonably sure that these two things
are harmful to consumers (though there are scattered doubters); these incurable skeptics
doubt that other intervention is worth the costs." Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Pol-
icy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1701 (1986). For discussions of the development of a Chicago
School perspective in antitrust, see G.E. Garvey & GJ. Garvey, Economic Law and Eco-
nomic Growth 103-20 (1990); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 96, at 969-88; Page., supra note
4, at 1228-37; K. Nelson, Comments On a Paper By Posner, 127 U. Pa. L Rev. 949
(1979).
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Posner, and Ralph Winter have proven influential in shaping judicial dis-
course about the appropriate path for antitrust doctrine. As adherents to
the conservative court packing hypothesis have suggested, the appoint-
ment of academicians experienced in antitrust and economic regulation
has had a qualitatively important impact on antitrust jurisprudence that
a mere recitation of voting statistics does not reveal.
A. Conservative Aspects of Carter Appointee Voting
For evidentiary support, the conservative court-packing hypothesis
rests chiefly on the voting behavior of a small number of Reagan appoin-
tees to the courts of appeals."' The non-immunity data assembled for
this survey show that several prominent Reagan appointees with law and
economics backgrounds have accumulated highly conservative voting
records. Reagan appointees whose votes in non-immunity cases adhered
closely to a conservative agenda during the survey period include Pasco
Bowman of the Eighth Circuit (two liberal votes in thirteen cases), 147
Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit (no liberal votes in twelve
cases),'48 Ernest Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit (no liberal votes in
eight cases),"' 9 and Ralph Winter of the Second Circuit (no liberal votes
146. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
147. Judge Bowman cast liberal votes in United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 809 F.2d
480 (8th Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); United States v. Ben M. Hogan
Co., 769 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986). He cast conservative
votes in Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1989); City of Mount Pleasant v.
Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988); Lomar Wholesale Grocery,
Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1010 (1988); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1026 (1988); Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d 415 (8th Cir.
1986); Pink Supply Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc., 788 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1986); Pumps &
Power Co. v. Southern States Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1986); Midwest Com-
munications, Inc. v. Minnesota Twins, Inc., 779 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1163 (1986); Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484 (8th
Cir. 1985); Henke Enters. v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1984);
Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
148. Judge Easterbrook cast conservative votes in Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1948
(1990); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthal-
mology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844
F.2d 473 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988); Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam
Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Southwest Sub-
urban Bd. of Realtors v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 830 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1987);
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986) (dissent); Illinois Corporate
Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986); Local Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Will v. Comprehensive Account-
ing Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986); Polk Bros.,
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
149. Judge Higginbotham cast conservative votes in United States v. MMR Corp., 907
F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v.
Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988);
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in fourteen cases). 5 ' Although their voting records attract less attention
in discussions concerning Reagan judicial appointments, one could add
other Reagan appointees with decidedly conservative voting tendencies,
such as Robert Beezer of the Ninth Circuit (two liberal votes in thirteen
cases),"' Edward Davis of the Fifth Circuit (no liberal votes in twelve
cases),"5 2 George Fagg of the Eighth Circuit (one liberal vote in thirteen
Greenwood Util. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed,
474 U.S. 1001 (1985); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d
1316 (5th Cir. 1984); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735
F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Greenhaw v. Lubbock
County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d
1217 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
150. Judge Winter cast conservative votes in Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901
F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1990); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335
(2d Cir. 1988); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Argus, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987); Rand v.
Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986);
United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1985); Burlington Coat Factory Ware-
house Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985); Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine
Child, Inc., 754 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v.
American Soe'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Phillips Business Sys., Inc. v. Executive Communica-
tions Sys., Inc., 744 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,
743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical
Center, 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
151. Judge Beezer cast liberal votes in Trans Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 766
F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (dissent), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); Farley Transp.
Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 777 F.2d 472, withdrawn, 786 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1985). He cast conservative votes in R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc.,
890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1988) (dissent); McGlinchey v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988); Continen-
tal Maritime v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1987);
National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert
dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987); Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234 (9th
Cir. 1987); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
788 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 754 F.2d 1445
(9th Cir. 1985); RFD Publications, Inc. v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 749 F.2d 1327 (9th
Cir. 1984); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir. 1984) (dissent).
152. Judge Davis cast conservative votes in R.D. Imports Ryno Indus., Inc. v. Mazda
Distribs. (Gull), Inc., 807 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 818 (1987); Goss v.
Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986); Irving Ear, Nose, Throat & Allergy
Clinic v. Group Hosp. Serv., Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 6,849 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1985); Park v.
El Paso 1d. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1102
(1986); Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985);
Eximo, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1984); Walker v. U-Haul Co., 747 F.2d
1011 (5th Cir. 1984); Walker v. U-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1984); Royal Drug
Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 469 U.S.
1160 (1985); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884
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cases),"13 Joel Flaum of the Seventh Circuit (four liberal votes in 22
cases),"4 William Garwood of the Fifth Circuit (no liberal votes in
eleven cases),' 55 Cynthia Hall of the Ninth Circuit (one liberal vote in
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); United States v. American Airlines,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985).
153. Judge Fagg cast a liberal vote in Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI
Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987). He cast
conservative votes in South Dakota v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 726 (1990); Alpha Shoe Serv. v. Fleming Cos., 849 F.2d
352 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Famous Brands, Inc. v. David Sherman
Corp., 814 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Northern Improvement Co., 814
F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 846 (1987); Central Hardware Co. v. Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 770 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d
466 (8th Cir. 1985) (dissent); Henke Enters., Inc. v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d
488 (8th Cir. 1984); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984); McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Becker v. Egypt News Co., 713 F.2d 363
(8th Cir. 1983); Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 931 (1984); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en
bane), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
154. Judge Flaum cast liberal votes in Illinois ex rel Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988); West Allis
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1988); Isaksen v. Vermont Cast-
ings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
He cast conservative votes in Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (1991); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,
898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990); First Comics, Inc. v. World
Color Press, Inc., 884 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1123 (1990);
Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989); A & M
Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988); 3 Penny Theater Corp. v.
Plitt Theatres, Inc., 812 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1987); Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (concurring opinion); Ezpeleta v. Sisters
of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Morrison v. Murray
Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); Ball
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Brillhart
v. Mutual Medical Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Carl Sandburg Village Condo-
minium Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condominium Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1985); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984); Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1984); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1984); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
155. Judge Garwood cast conservative votes in In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907
F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1990); Bell v. Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1988); Consol-
idated Metal Prods., Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988);
Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1023 (1988); Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1987); Southwestern Sheet Metal Works v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 788 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756
F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985); Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Business Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986); Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th
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eleven cases),"6 and Robert Krupansky of the Sixth Circuit (no liberal
votes in thirteen cases).15 7
Of all Reagan appointees, the judge whose voting most often is said to
epitomize the effect of conservative court packing in antitrust is Richard
Posner.15 Critics of Judge Posner's antitrust jurisprudence present two
lines of evidence to support their view that he is spearheading a conserva-
tive redirection of judicial decisiomaking in antitrust matters. The first
is to cite statistical data on Judge Posner's voting record as proof of his
commitment to impose what Professor Ian Shapiro calls "a minimalist
view of antitrust law."' 9 Thus, Professor Bernard Schwartz emphasizes
that "in the seventeen antitrust cases in which [Posner] wrote opinions
on the merits, only one was decided in favor of the antitrust plaintiff."'I I
The second is to parse Judge Posner's opinions to identify efforts to place
unwarranted doctrinal obstacles in the path of plaintiffs seeking to invoke
the antitrust statutes.1 61
Cir. 1985); Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984);
Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982).
156. Judge Hall cast a liberal vote in Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Serv.,
Inc., 773 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1985). She cast conservative votes in Universal Analytics,
Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990); Metro Mobile CTS,
Inc. v. NewVector Communications, Inc., 892 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1989); Les Shockley
Racing, Inc. v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1989); Christofferson
Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1988); Ferguson v. Greater
Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1988); Orion Pictures
Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enters., 829 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1987); Souza v. Estate of Bishop,
821 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1987); Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 828
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Charley's Taxi Radio Dis-
patch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987); Exhibitors' Serv., Inc.
v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 788 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. Judge Krupansky voted conservatively in International Logistics Group, Ltd. v.
Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1783 (1990);
Guzowski v. Hartman, 849 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1988); Directory Sales Management Corp.
v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987); Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform
of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); United
States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d. 22 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Sarin v. Samari-
tan Health Center, 813 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1987); Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784
F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Donco Enters., Inc., 783 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986);
Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1986); McElhinney v. Medical
Protective Co., 738 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1984); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp.
Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983); Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1983); Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th
Cir. 1983).
158. See B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 238, 340; H. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 156-
57; Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1036-45.
159. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1040.
160. B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 236. Professor Schwartz relies heavily on data
collected by Professor Shapiro, who prefaces his critique of Posner's antitrust opinions by
comprehensively restating Posner's voting record in antitrust matters. See Shapiro, supra
note 31, at 1036-38; cf Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to "Richard Posner's
Praxis," 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1077 (1989) (response to Shapiro's critique).
161. See, e.g., B. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 236 ("Posner's negative attitude toward
the antitrust laws has led him to interpret them restrictively, so as to place heavy burdens
on plaintiffs who rely on statutes that interfere so directly with the efficiency produced by
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The cases surveyed in this Article provide grounds for evaluating both
criticisms. The first is to compare Judge Posner's aggregate voting rec-
ord with the records of other judges who participated in antitrust matters
during the survey period. Such comparisons can be misleading, as no
court of appeals judge encounters a menu of antitrust cases that exactly
replicates the number and type of cases faced by a colleague on the same
circuit or on a different circuit. Notwithstanding this limitation, the
logic of examining a judge's aggregate voting record is that such data is
at least a rough measure of the judge's antitrust preferences. In effect,
commentators who have criticized Judge Posner's voting behavior in an-
titrust cases have used votes for plaintiffs' victories as an index of liber-
alism. During the survey period for this Article, Judge Posner cast 25
votes in non-immunity antitrust cases. Five votes (20 percent) endorsed
positions consistent with the criteria for liberalism employed in this Arti-
cle,162 and 20 votes (80 percent) favored conservative results. 16 3 Thus,
free operation of the market."); Schwartz, A Friendly Judiciary, With Slots to Fill, Awaits
New President, Legal Times, Jan. 9, 1989, at 16 ("Posner's basic idea is to construe nar-
rowly the antitrust laws to allow a great deal of anti-competitive behavior and to skirt
inconsistent Supreme Court decisions.").
162. See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989); Illinois ex rel. Harti-
gan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 986 (1988); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 839 F.2d 1206
(dissent by Judge Posner), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988); Isaksen v. Vermont Casting, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). To assemble a complete list of
non-immunity cases in which Judge Posner has endorsed outcomes that favor plaintiffs,
one would add two other cases in which Judge Posner's vote is classified in this survey as
conservative. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), 111 S.
Ct. 295 (1990); Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir.
1988) (dissent); Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1988); Morri-
son v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987);
Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987);
Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648
(7th Cir. 1984); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985); Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598
(7th Cir. 1984); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck
Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488 (replacing opinion published at 692
F.2d 1083), vacated, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982); Products Liab.
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Indus-
trial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016
(1983); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1107 (1983); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119
(7th Cir. 1982).
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Judge Posner cast conservative votes slightly less often than Reagan ap-
pointees as a whole (20 percent versus 17.7 percent).
Let us assume that Posnerian voting behavior is a meaningful bench-
mark of antitrust conservatism. To determine whether Judge Posner's
voting record is as aberrant as some commentators suggest, this survey
has identified all Carter and Reagan appointees who voted in at least ten
non-immunity cases. The ten decisions minimum serves to identify
judges who have addressed antitrust issues somewhat regularly. Eight
Carter appointees participated in at least ten non-immunity antitrust
cases during the survey period and voted conservatively more often than
Judge Posner. Carter judges with more conservative voting records in
non-immunity matters are Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit (no liberal
votes in sixteen cases),I" Amalya Kearse of the Second Circuit (two lib-
eral votes in twelve cases), 6 ' Dickson Phillips of the Fourth Circuit
(three liberal votes in 25 cases),166 Sam Johnson of the Fifth Circuit (two
164. Judge Breyer cast conservative votes in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,
915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cerL denied, II S. Ct. 1337 (1991); Monahan's Marine, Inc.
v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1989); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New
England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst.,
851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Texaco P.R., Inc. v.
Medina, 834 F.2d 242 (Ist Cir. 1987); Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); Computer Identics Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co., 756
F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985); Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1029 (1985); Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 739 F.2d
671 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191 (1985); Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. Pac-
car Fin. Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (Ist Cir. 1984); Systemized of New England, Inc. v. SCM,
Inc., 732 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1984); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227 (1st Cir. 1983); White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1982); Auburn News
Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982); Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1981); Cor-
dova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st
Cir. 1981).
165. Judge Kearse cast liberal votes in Gonzalez v. Saint Margaret's House Hous. Dev.
Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514 (2d Cir. 1989); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068
(2d Cir. 1980). Judge Kearse cast conservative votes in Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland,
901 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1990); Auwood v. Henry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884
(2d Cir. 1988); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Konick v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical
Center, 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef Proces-
sors, Inc., 715 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1983); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 677 F.2d 946 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power
Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Siemens Corp.,
621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980).
166. Judge Phillips cast liberal votes in Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribs.,
Inc., 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists
v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
Judge Phillips cast conservative votes in Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924 (4th
Cir. 1990); Sewell Plastics Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1019 (1991); Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thom-
asville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989); Parkway Gallery Furniture,
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liberal votes in thirteen cases), 167 Henry Politz of the Fifth Circuit (three
liberal votes in seventeen cases),168 Thomas Reavley of the Fifth Circuit
Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989); Nobel
Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 831 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1226 (1988); Eastern Publishing & Advertising, Inc. v. Chesapeake Pub-
lishing & Advertising, Inc., 831 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 492 U.S. 913 (1989);
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1987);
Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir.
1987); Fran Welch Real Estate Sales, Inc. v. Seabrook Island Co., 809 F.2d 1030 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. A-A-A Elec. Co., 788 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1986); United States
v. W.F. Brinkley & Son Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1986); Eastern Auto Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 795 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005
(1985); National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.
1985); United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1982); Allc-
gheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d 411
(4th Cir. 1982); Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15
(4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,
631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d
438 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Marty's Floor Covering Co. v. GAF Corp., 604 F.2d
266 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d
1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
167. Judge Johnson cast liberal votes in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,
704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). Judge John-
son cast conservative votes in Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d
1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 224 (1988); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 749 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985); Walker v. U-Haul Co.,
747 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985); Walker v. U-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1984); Transource Int'l, Inc. v.
Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1984); Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 710 F.2d 216
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp.,
674 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1982).
168. Judge Politz cast liberal votes in Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1987);
Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Judge Politz
cast conservative votes in McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1985);Greenwood Util.
Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bi-Co Pavers,
Inc., 741 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1984); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732
F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d
274 (5th Cir. 1984); Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th
Cir. 1983); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell,
Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672
F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1982); Guzik v. State Bar of Tex., 659 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125
(1983).
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(two liberal votes in fourteen cases),169 Carolyn Randall King of the
Fifth Circuit (two liberal votes in thirteen cases), 7 ° and Cornelia Ken-
nedy of the Sixth Circuit (one liberal vote in fourteen cases)."1
In addition, a number of Carter judges participated in ten or more
non-immunity cases and voted conservatively as often or only slightly
less often than Judge Posner. These are Jon Newman of the Second Cir-
cuit (three liberal votes in fourteen cases),'" Arthur Alarcon of the
169. Judge Reavley cast liberal votes in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,
704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). Judge
Reavley cast conservative votes in Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986); Olympia Co. v. Celo-
tex Corp., 771 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 736 (1989); Jayco Sys.,
Inc. v. Savin Business Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
816 (1986); Plueckhan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 749 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 905 (1985); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 881 (1984); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d 787
(5th Cir. 1983); Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 832 (1982); Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston lighting
& Power Co., 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
170. Judge King cast liberal votes in Powers v. Nassau Dev. Corp., 753 F.2d 457 (5th
Cir. 1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985). Judge King cast
conservative votes in Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921 (5th
Cir. 1988); Irving Ear, Nose, Throat & Allergy Clinic v. Group Hosp. Serv., Inc., 1985-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 6,849 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); United States
v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1984); Century Oil Tool, Inc, v. Production
Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1984); Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1983); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480 (5th
Cir. 1984); Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. American Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.
1982); Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Municipal
Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1982); Abadir & Co. v. First
Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981); S & M Materials Co. v. Southern Stone Co.,
612 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980).
171. Judge Kennedy cast a liberal vote in Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1985) (dissent). Judge Kennedy cast conservative
votes in Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1990); Riverview Invs., Inc. v.
Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, I ll S. Ct.
151 (1990); Fallis v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 866 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1989); Strat-
more v. Goodbody, 866 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989); HyPoint
Technology, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 869 F.2d 1491 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Rao v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 835 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Directory Sales
Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987); LB. Cleveland,
Inc. v. Bluestone, 820 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Smith v. Northern Mich.
Hosps., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982)
(dissent), vacated, 461 U.S. 940 (1983); Hillside Dairy Co. v. Fairmont Foods Co., 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 4,375 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Kingsport Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 644 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1981); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical
Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
172. Judge Newman cast liberal votes in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
S.A., 871 F.2d 252, amended, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 939 (1989);
Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Broadway Delivery Corp. v.
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Ninth Circuit (three liberal votes in fifteen cases), 173 Betty Fletcher of the
Ninth Circuit (three liberal votes in thirteen cases), 74 William Norris of
the Ninth Circuit (three liberal votes in thirteen cases), 175 Mary Schroe-
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968
(1981). Judge Newman cast conservative votes in Westchester Radiological Assocs., P.C.
v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842
F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1987); Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Calcu Gas, Inc., 754
F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1985); Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985);
Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Levitch v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Unijax, Inc. v. Champion Int'l, Inc.,
683 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Reading Indus., Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981).
173. Judge Alarcon cast liberal votes in Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034 (9th
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d
1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985); Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc. 681
F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982). Judge Alarcon cast conservative votes in R.C. Dick Geother-
mal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Eichman v.
Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989); USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (dissent), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); The Jeanery,
Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of
N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); O.S.C.
Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Drinkwine v. Federated
Publications, Inc., 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1087 (1986);
United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1985); American Passage Media Corp. v.
Cass Communications, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1985); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive,
Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 732 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1984); Derish v. San Ma-
teo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1983); Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
174. Judge Fletcher cast liberal votes in Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d
1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cer. denied, 110 S. Ct. 140 (1989); Southwest Marine, Inc. v.
Campbell Indus., 732 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984);
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 921 (1981). Judge Fletcher cast conservative votes in Eichman v. Fotomat
Corp., 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989); Alliance Shippers, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 858 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988); Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
833 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1987); Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Oakland Tribune Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing
Co., 762 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1985); Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1985); Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
820 (1983); Maykuth v. Adolph Coors Co., 690 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1982); Hamro v. Shell
Oil Co., 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982); Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130 (1985).
175. Judge Norris cast liberal votes in R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics,
Inc., 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (dissent); Syufy Enters. v. American Mul-
ticinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 1034 (1987);
Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1981). Judge
Norris cast conservative votes in Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875
F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1989); Bubar v. Ampco Foods, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 6,387
(9th Cir. 1985); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762 F.2d 1374 (9th
Cir. 1985); De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.
1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985); Calculators Haw., Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724
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der of the Ninth Circuit (two liberal votes in ten cases), 176 Thomas Tang
of the Ninth Circuit (two liberal votes in ten cases), 77 Lanier Anderson
of the Eleventh Circuit (three liberal votes in thirteen cases), 78 Frank
Johnson of the Eleventh Circuit (three liberal votes in fourteen cases), 17 9
F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1983); Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983) (dissent), rev'd, 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Chel-
son v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983) (dissent); General Busi-
ness Sys., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1983); Sports Form,
Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1982); Community Builders, Inc. v.
City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
176. Judge Schroeder cast liberal votes in City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872
F.2d 1401, amended, 886 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1126 (1990); D
& S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
Judge Schroeder cast conservative votes in Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwen-
dler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Newman v. Universal Pictures,
813 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1987); Ralph C. Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Chronicle Broadcasting
Co., 794 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley
Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1986); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 732 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1984); Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714
F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Cascade Cabinet Co. v. West-
era Cabinet & Millwork Inc., 710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983); Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v.
Blue Shield, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1986).
177. Judge Tang cast liberal votes in E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. General Portland,
Inc., 885 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1989); D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting
Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). Judge Tang cast conservative votes in West Coast
Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1990); Christofferson Dairy,
Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1988); Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three
Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1987); 49er Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
803 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); Catlin v. Washington
Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986); Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best
Seam Inc., 694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); David Orgell,
Inc. v. Geary's Stores, Inc., 640 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981);
First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 924 (1980).
178. Judge Anderson cast liberal votes in DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills
Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 1813 (1990); Heli-
copter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530 (1Ith Cir. 1987);
Tiftarea Shopper, Inc. v. Georgia Shopper, Inc., 786 F.2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam). Judge Anderson cast conservative votes in Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v.
Barclays Am./Commercial, Inc., 919 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. CL 1642 (1989);
Cable Holdings of Ga. Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559 (1lth Cir. 1987); Ameri-
can Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1985); LA. Draper & Son v.
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (11th Cir. 1984); Construction Aggregate
Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983); Nichols v.
Mobile Bd. of Realtors, 675 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1982); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon
Corp., 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Almeda Mall, Inc.
v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870
(1980); Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906
(1980).
179. Judge Johnson cast liberal votes in United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478 (1 1th
Cir. 1990); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1987);
Maid-Pour v. Georgiana Community Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1984). Judge
Johnson cast conservative votes in Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 887 F.2d
1480 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3258 (1990); National Bancard Corp. v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); McGee v.
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and Phyllis Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit (two liberal votes in ten
cases). 80 In sum, twelve Carter appointees (Breyer, Kearse, Phillips,
Sam Johnson, Politz, Reavley, King, Alarcon, Schroeder, Tang,
Kravitch, and Kennedy) and eleven Reagan appointees (Joseph Altimari
of the Second Circuit,"'1 Beezer, Bowman, Davis, Easterbrook, Fagg,
Flaum, Hall, Garwood, Krupansky, and Winter) cast at least ten votes in
non-immunity cases and voted conservatively as often or more often than
Judge Posner.
One qualification to keep in mind in considering these data is that 47
Carter appointees voted in ten or more non-immunity cases during the
survey period, whereas only 18 Reagan appointees met or exceeded the
ten decisions minimum. The pool of Reagan judges who could satisfy the
ten decisions minimum is necessarily smaller because fewer Reagan ap-
pointees have served long enough to participate in a significant number
of non-immunity antitrust matters. Roughly 61 percent of the Reagan
judges (11 of 18) who participated in ten matters voted as conservatively
or more conservatively than Judge Posner, compared to roughly 25 per-
cent of Carter judges (12 of 47) who voted in ten cases. Nonetheless, if
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 761 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 905 (1985); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (1lth Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986); Thomas v. Soper, 746 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir.
1984) (per curiam); L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (1 1th
Cir. 1984); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical
Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), rev'd, 460 U.S.
150 (1983); General Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., USA, 625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir.
1980).
180. Judge Kravitch cast liberal votes in Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919
F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990). Judge Kravitch cast conservative votes in
American Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1985); Lombard's,
Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986); Cha-Car, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609 (1lth Cir. 1985); Spar-
tan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 735 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1109 (1985); Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627 (1 1th Cir. 1984); McClure v.
Undersea Indus., Inc., 671 F.2d 1287 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983);
Nichols v. Mobile Bd. of Realtors, 675 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1982); Joe Regueira, Inc. v.
American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1981).
181. Judge Altimari voted in ten non-immunity matters during the survey period. He
cast liberal votes in two matters: R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989); Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional
Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988). He cast conservative votes in eight matters:
Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990); Official
Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
S.A., 871 F.2d 252, amended, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939
(1989); Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc., 863 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Auwood v.
Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1988); Best Brands Beverage,
Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1987); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro,
822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
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Judge Posner's voting record were decidedly extreme in its tendency to
restrict the application of the antitrust laws, one would not expect him to
be accompanied or surpassed by so many Carter appointees.
The second critique of Judge Posner is that his opinions embrace un-
duly permissive analytical approaches. The cases examined in this Arti-
cle dictate caution in assuming that Judge Posner's views are invariably
extreme or, at a minimum, unique to Reagan appointees. A useful point
of comparison is the opinion-writing of Carter appointee Stephen Breyer,
who joined the First Circuit in 1980. 12 During the survey period, Judge
Breyer cast 17 votes in antitrust matters.1 83 Each vote supported the
defendant's position, and only one vote (involving a state action immu-
nity issue)1 contradicted this survey's conservative criteria. In non-im-
munity cases, Judge Breyer participated in more decisions than any other
Carter or Reagan appointee during the survey period without casting a
liberal vote.
Judge Breyer's opinions are distinctive for their scholarly, careful ap-
proach. Indeed, no federal judge writes more thoughtfully and elegantly
about antitrust issues than Judge Breyer. In a number of instances,
Judge Breyer's antitrust opinions have adopted conservative perspectives
in evaluating the legality of challenged distribution practices"8 ' and sin-
gle-firm pricing conduct. 86 In addressing these and other antitrust is-
sues, the Breyer opinions have expressed recurring concern about
adopting conduct rules that would diminish incentives to compete8 7 and
182. For a discussion of Judge Breyer's jurisprudence, see Latin, Legal and Economic
Considerations in the Decisions of Judge Breyer, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs., No. 4, at 57
(Autumn 1987).
183. The non-immunity cases in which Judge Breyer has participated are listed supra
in note 164.
184. Massachusetts Furniture & Piano Movers Ass'n v. FTC, 773 F.2d 391 (Ist Cir.
1985).
185. See, e-g., Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 527-30
(Ist Cir. 1989) (rejecting liability in price discrimination case); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru
of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797-800 (Ist Cir. 1988) (rejecting liability in tying
case); Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 21-26 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(rejecting liability in price discrimination case).
186. See, eg., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 482-86 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (rejecting liability in predatory pricing case), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007
(1989); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230-36 (Ist Cir. 1983)
(same); cf Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-29 (Ist Cir. 1990)
(rejecting claim that electric utility used illegal price squeeze to monopolize local distri-
bution), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991).
187. In Barry Wright, Judge Breyer observed that "a legal precedent or rule of law that
prevents a firm from unilaterally cutting its prices risks interference with one of the Sher-
man Act's most basic objectives: the low price levels that one would find in well-func-
tioning competitive markets." Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 231 (citations omitted). In
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the Supreme
Court echoed Judge Breyer's concern about incentive effects. The Court quoted Barry
Wright approvingly for the view that "mistaken inferences" in exclusionary pricing dis-
putes "are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect. ... '[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes
a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging
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about the administrability of suggested liability standards.188 In particu-
lar, Judge Breyer has played an influential role in discouraging consider-
ation of the defendant's subjective expressions of intent in evaluating
claims of unlawful exclusion. 18 9
The data on voting and opinion-writing by individual judges show that
conservative antitrust perspectives are not alien to Carter appellate
judges."9° The importance of conservative perspectives to Carter ap-
pointee decisionmaking is also evident from significant instances in
which Carter judges have disagreed with each other in non-immunity
matters. Nine cases have featured disagreement between Carter judges
on panels that included no Reagan appointees.' 9' In two of these cases,
policy perspectives embodied in a conservative dissent by a Carter judge
were subsequently embraced in a Supreme Court reversal of the court of
appeals majority. 192 In still other instances, Carter appointees have al-
lied themselves with Reagan judges who authored opinions that some
commentators have criticized as excessively permissive.'93
legitimate price competition."' Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (quoting Barry Wright, 724
F.2d at 234).
188. Administrability concerns figured prominently in Judge Breyer's opinion in
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1029 (1985). Judge Breyer emphasized "a judicial recognition of the practical difficulties
of determining what is a 'reasonable' or 'competitive' price." Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927. In
Barry Wright, Judge Breyer observed that "rules that seek to embody every economic
complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove
counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve." Barry
Wright, 724 F.2d at 234.
189. " '[I]ntent to harm' without more offers too vague a standard in a world where
executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business,' and long-term effects on
consumers depend in large measure on competitors' responses." See Barry Wright, 724
F.2d at 232 (citation omitted). In a recent Robinson-Patman Act opinion rejecting a
predatory pricing claim, Judge Easterbrook quoted from Judge Breyer's Barry Wright
opinion in concluding that courts should ignore subjective expressions of the defendant's
intent in evaluating exclusionary conduct allegations. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-02 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1326 (1990).
190. One study of 142 antitrust decisions issued by the courts of appeals in 1987 found
a strong tendency by Democratic and Republican appointees alike to embrace what the
study's authors regarded as excessively conservative analytical techniques. A summary
of the study's results observes that "given the number of 'liberal' judges who've either
authored or gone along with these economically-unsound antitrust opinions . . . more
than ideology is clearly at work here on the federal bench." Judges Versus Juries, supra
note 32, at 10.
191. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
192. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988)
(majority consisting of Carter appointees Nelson and Reinhardt; dissent by Carter ap-
pointee Alarcon), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v.
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983) (majority consisting
of Carter appointees Boochever and Ferguson; dissent by Carter appointee Norris), rev'd,
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
193. The antitrust votes of Judge Ruth Ginsburg, a Carter appointee to the District of
Columbia Circuit, illustrate this phenomenon. Judge Ginsburg cast votes endorsing
Judge Robert Bork's majority opinions in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987) and Neumann v.
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A review of modem developments in Supreme Court antitrust juris-
prudence, in academic analysis, and in the country's economic and polit-
ical environment suggests why it is unsurprising that conservative
antitrust perspectives would exert an important influence upon Carter
judicial appointees. The past twenty years have featured a significant re-
orientation of Supreme Court antitrust thinking. The changes since 1974
stand out in sharper relief when set against the backdrop of prevailing
Supreme Court views of the 1960s and early 1970s, a period of expansive
applications of antitrust doctrine. Court decisions of the earlier period
treated vertical contractual restraints with the utmost suspicion"9 and
forbade horizontal mergers involving more than relatively trivial market
shares. 95 The Court also adhered to a comparatively rigid dichotomy
between per se offenses and rule of reason analysis and tended to use per
se prohibitions extensively in framing antitrust rules. 9 6 Chicago School
economic analysis played virtually no role in guiding the Court's choice
of conduct standards197
Compared to the analytical models established from Brown Shoe in
1962 through Topco in 1972, the Court's decisions since 1974 generally
have turned toward the right.1 98 The United States v. General Dynamics
Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986). In
1987, opponents of Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court repeatedly cited
Rothery and Neumann as examples of dangerous judicial activism and criticized these
decisions for espousing excessively permissive analytical approaches. See eg., Testimony
of Robert Pitofsky, in Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Pt. 3, at 3443, 3453-55 (1987) (criticizing Rothery); Statement of Robert Abrams, in id. at
3417, 3426-27 (criticizing Neumann and Rothery). More recently, Judge Ginsburgjoined
Judge Clarence Thomas (a Bush appointee) and Judge David Sentelle (a Reagan ap-
pointee) in rejecting a Department of Justice challenge to a merger of two manufacturers
of underground drilling equipment. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Baker Hughes treatment of ease of entry as a merger analysis
criterion has impeded Justice Department efforts to pursue a more stringent antimerger
policy. See Austin, The DOJ's New Entry Analysis and the Courts: Does Ease of Entry
Still Trump Market Concentration?, 5 Antitrust 34 (Fall/Winter 1990).
194. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500-10
(1969); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1967); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 319-
22 (1966).
195. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-52 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-74 (1966).
196. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-12 (1972).
197. Non-reliance upon Chicago School learning does not mean that the Supreme
Court's decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s ignored economic analysis. For example,
the Court's merger jurisprudence of the 1960s drew upon economic models that favored
aggressive efforts to discourage increases in horizontal concentration. See Gelihorn, The
Practical Uses of Economic Analysis: Hope vs. Reality, 56 Antitrust i.J. 933, 933 (1988);
Kaplow, supra note 29, at 185-86; Kovacic, supra note 13, at 25-26; see also Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 217-26 (1985) (discussing impor-
tance of economic learning in shaping antitrust policy throughout history of federal anti-
trust statutes); Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models The Faustian
Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. LJ. 1511, 1513-20 (1984) (same).
198. See Calvani & Sibarium, supra note 4, at 126-74; see also Baker, supra note 127, at
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Corp.199 merger decision in 1974 opened the door to the use of sophisti-
cated economic arguments to rebut presumptions based upon market
share thresholds.200 The Court's 1977-1978 term accelerated the redirec-
tion that General Dynamics tentatively had foreshadowed with its deci-
sions in Continental T V., Ina v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,2"1 Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.," and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.2"3 In the
past decade, the Court has adopted more permissive liability standards
for tying arrangements' 4 and certain group boycotts, 20 5 applied reasona-
bleness standards to a broader collection of horizontal restraints, 2° indi-
cated acute skepticism toward price-based theories of exclusionary
conduct,2 ' 7 increased the evidentiary burden plaintiffs must satisfy to es-
tablish the existence of an illegal agreement in conspiracy cases, 208 and
tightened standing and antitrust injury requirements for private plain-
tiffs.20 9 Moreover, the Court's more liberal members have endorsed
many of these developments.2 10
This is not to say that Supreme Court antitrust decisions of the past
fifteen years have pointed uniformly in the direction of more permissive
liability standards. The Court's apparent embrace in Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Co.2 11 of a broad notion of a monopolist's duty
to deal with rivals has breathed new life into plaintiffs' efforts to use es-
sential facility arguments and related theories to pursue attempted mo-
nopolization and monopolization challenges to single-firm conduct 2 12--a
655 ("Over the past fifteen years, the courts and enforcement agencies have created Rob-
ert Bork's Antitrust Paradise. Antitrust has adopted the Chicago School's efficiency
analysis and the Chicago School's conclusions about the effects of business practices.").
199. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
200. See id at 498-504.
201. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
202. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
203. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
204. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-16 (1984).
205. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 290, 298 (1985).
206. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
207. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93
(1986).
208. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-36 (1988);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-98 (1986); Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984).
209. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1889-91
(1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-22 (1986).
210. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield, 110 S. Ct. at 1887 (majority opinion by Justice Bren-
nan; Court majority including Justices Blackmun and Marshall); Business Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 719 (1988) (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
voting with Court majority); Cargill, 479 U.S. at 105 (majority opinion by Justice Bren-
nan); see also Calkins, supra note 75, at 376-77 (discussing Justice Brennan's role in shap-
ing modern Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence).
211. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
212. See id at 601-05, 608-11.
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development that many commentators across the conservative-liberal
spectrum have viewed with unease.21 3 In Federal Trade Commission v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,21 4 the Court strongly reaf-
firmed the utility of per se rules2 5 and indirectly questioned the useful-
ness of market power screens to evaluate certain antitrust claims.2'6
More often than not, however, the Court since 1972 has moved the focus
of antitrust analysis in directions that conservatives have approved.
The Supreme Court's antitrust decisions reflect a second basic force
that has brought a more conservative perspective to appellate decision-
making. The Court has moved rightward partly in response to a new
consensus among academics that favors a more limited role for antitrust
intervention. Many Chicago School preferences of Robert Bork and
Richard Posner that were regarded as extremist in the 1970s have be-
come mainstream elements of academic discourse in the 1980s. 21 7 Nu-
merous scholars have questioned the proper weight to be given to
allocative efficiency in antitrust analysis,218 and others have disputed
Chicago School teaching about the range of sensible enforcement pos-
sibilities to be derived from economic analysis operating within an alloca-
tive efficiency perspective. 19 Nonetheless, few question the centrality of
economic analysis as a tool in modem antitrust reasoning. Indeed, most
academic critics of Reagan Administration enforcement policies disavow
any interest in returning to doctrinal approaches that characterized
many Warren Court decisions of the 1960s.1 ° The segment of the acad-
emy dedicated to studying antitrust and industrial organization is more
213. See eg., P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 36.1a, at 741 (Supp. 1990)
("[T]he 'essential facility' is just an epithet describing the monopolist's situation: he pos-
sesses something the plaintiff wants. It is not an independent tool of analysis but only a
label-a label that beguiles some commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to
deal .... "); Panel Discussion, Exclusionary Conduct, 57 Antitrust LJ. 723, 742 (1989)
(remarks of William Baxter) ("Someone invested in that essential facility. Someone got
out in front when it wasn't at all clear that the facility was going to work, and now
someone else wants to come along and help themselves. The doctrine is a very dangerous
one.").
214. 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
215. See id. at 780; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
348 (1982) (approving per se condemnation for horizontal agreements to fix maximum
prices).
216. See Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 781 & n.18.
217. See Baker, supra note 127, at 655; Kovacic IV, supra note 4, at 1442-59.
218. For recent efforts to collect these authorities and summarize their views, see
Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, 'Original Intent' and the Legislative
History of the Sherman Act, 33 Antitrust Bull. 259, 265-68, 290-300 (1988); Lande, The
Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler ofAntitrust, 33 Antitrust Bull. 429, 447-
57 (1988); May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the
Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59 Antitrust LJ. 93, 94-95 (1990).
219. See infra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
220. See Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 Geo. LJ. 321, 323-24 (1987); cf.
Flynn, supra note 9, at 885-86 (observing that "the Warren Court era judges may have
gone too far in their concern for populist values in cases like Von's Grocery and
Schwinn").
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conservative today that it was twenty years ago.22 1
Because the Supreme Court and academics have adopted a more con-
servative outlook, it is not surprising that conservative perspectives
would influence court of appeals judges in the routine process of deciding
antitrust matters. For example, well before Ronald Reagan gained the
presidency, the courts of appeals had begun to transform conduct stan-
dards governing single-firm behavior.2 2 2 Taking a cue from influential
commentaries such as Philip Areeda's and Donald Turner's 1975 article,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act,2 23 appellate judges in the mid to late 1970s started to give dominant
firms greater leeway in choosing pricing, product development, and pro-
motion strategies. 224 Not only did appellate judges learn of the emerg-
ing, conservative-oriented literature from citations in defendants' briefs,
but programs such as Henry Manne's economics institutes for federal
judges ensured that a large number of judges would be exposed directly
to the "new learning" in antitrust.225
The rightward shift in Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence and aca-
demic scholarship since the early 1960s has occurred in the context of a
major adjustment in the relative position of the United States in the
226 Teacnworld economy. The ascent of Western Europe and Japan in the
221. See, e-g., White, The Revolution in Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Relationships:
How Did We Get from There to Here?, in Economics and Antitrust Policy 103 (R. Lamer
& J. Meehan, Jr. eds. 1989) (modern transformation of vertical restraints analysis and
doctrine); F. Scherer, On the Current State of Knowledge in Industrial Economics 1, 4-11
(Discussion Paper IIM/IP 84-24, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin: Aug. 1984) (crumbling
of structure-conduct-performance paradigm underpinning structural antitrust enforce-
ment approaches of 1960s and 1970s) (on file at the Fordham Law Review).
222. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The rightward shift in the 1970s in the
courts of appeals' analysis of dominant firm conduct is ignored by commentators who
conclude that Reagan judicial appointees fostered an abrupt departure from a compara-
tively liberal antitrust jurisprudence. For example, one commentator observed that "in
1981, with the influx of the new Reagan judges, this level-playing-field (fairness) concept
of antitrust began to undergo a dramatic revision, turning sharply away from a recogni-
tion of the vital economic role of the small, new firms and toward, instead, an exclusive
concern with the interests of the giant firms in each industry." Mueller, supra note 20, at
49.
223. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 126.
224. See, eg., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th
Cir. 1977) (relying on Areeda-Turner predatory pricing test to reject plaintiff's predatory
pricing claims), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352,
1358 (9th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); International Air Indus.,
Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 943 (1976).
225. Dean Manne's Law and Economics Center held its first economics institute for
federal judges in 1976. By 1980, nearly one-fifth of the federal judiciary had taken one of
the Law and Economics Center's courses for judges. See Barbash, Big Corporations
Bankroll Seminars for U.S. Judges, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1980, at A-1, col. 1; Guzzardi,
Jr., Judges Discover the World of Economics, Fortune, May 21, 1979, at 66.
226. Changes in economic conditions, and adjustments in the political environment
that such changes produce, influence the content of antitrust policy. See Gellhorn,
Climbing the Antitrust Staircase, 31 Antitrust Bull. 341, 350-51 (1986); Kaplow, supra
note 29, at 181-83.
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1970s as potent economic rivals to the United States created strong polit-
ical pressure to reevaluate domestic regulatory policies, including anti-
trust, that affect the competitive capability of American firms.rn Among
other effects, such pressure moved Congress in 1984 to loosen antitrust
restrictions on certain forms of horizontal collaboration. 8 By the late
1970s, doubts about the vitality of domestic firms contributed to a wide-
spread judicial unwillingness to sustain plaintiffs' antitrust challenges to
dominant firm product development activities." 9 Efficiency concerns
necessarily assumed greater significance in the resolution of antitrust
disputes.
Even if President Carter had won a second term in 1980, appellate
decisionmaking in antitrust matters probably would have continued to
generate a significant number of conservative outcomes. As a group, the
Reagan appointees appear to hold narrower antitrust preferences than
their Carter counterparts, and the data above suggest that they vote con-
servatively more often in antitrust disputes than do Carter appointees.
Nonetheless, this difference would be substantially greater if conservative
rulings of the Supreme Court, conservative academic commentary, and
changes in the country's economic and political environment had not
deeply influenced the antitrust thinking of many Carter appellate judges.
If conservative antitrust perspectives did not exert a substantial pull
across the appellate judiciary, it would be difficult to explain recent deci-
sions such as United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc ," in which a Bush
appointee (Clarence Thomas), a Carter appointee (Ruth Ginsburg), and
a Reagan appointee (David Sentelle) unanimously adopted strongly pro-
defendant analytical techniques for reviewing mergers.231
B. Interventionist Tendencies Among Reagan Appointees
A corollary to the view that antitrust permissiveness is a distinctive
trait of Reagan appointees is that judges favoring aggressive antitrust in-
tervention reside almost exclusively within the ranks of Carter appoin-
tees. The data in this survey indicate that judges with decidedly liberal
voting records usually are Carter appointees. The survey also reveals,
however, a noteworthy number of instances in which Reagan judges en-
dorse relatively liberal outcomes. Among other traits, the "conserva-
227. See Fox, The Future of the Per Se Rule: Two Visions at War With One Another,
29 Washburn LJ. 200, 205 (1990); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 709.
228. In the National Cooperative Research and Development Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4302-03 (1988), Congress provided that certain research and development joint ven-
tures are to be evaluated under the rule of reason and that participants in such ventures
may be held liable for actual damages, rather than treble damages, for antitrust violations
arising from the ventures' operations. For a discussion of the statute's background and
requirements, see Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Anti-
trust Regime for Joint Research and Development Ventures, I High Tech. LJ. 133 (1986).
229. See Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 7, at 113-28.
230. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
231. See id at 982-83.
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tism" attributed to Reagan appointees also sometimes takes the form of
resistance to invitations to qualify or overturn precedent on the basis of
new economic learning.
The survey indicates that, among Carter and Reagan appointees, the
judges with the strongest liberal preferences, measured by the frequency
of liberal voting in non-immunity cases, are Carter appointees. Six
Carter judges participating in ten or more non-immunity decisions en-
dorsed liberal outcomes at least half the time: Leon Higginbotham of the
Third Circuit (six liberal votes in eleven cases),232 Nathaniel Jones of the
Sixth Circuit (seven liberal votes in thirteen cases),233 Warren Boochever
of the Ninth Circuit (nine liberal votes in eighteen cases),234 Stephen
232. Judge Higginbotham cast liberal votes in Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 823
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 763 F.2d 1482 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986); Maley-Duff & Assocs.
v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Meni-
can, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983) (dissent), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1024 (1984); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573 (3d Cir. 1979) (dissent); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). Judge Higginbotham cast
conservative votes in Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); Houser v. Fox Theatres Management Corp.,
845 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1988); Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692 F.2d
307 (3d Cir. 1982); Tose v. First Penn. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 444
U.S. 866 (1979).
233. Judge Jones cast liberal votes in Allied Accessories & Auto Parts Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 901 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1990); Allied Accessories & Auto Parts Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 825 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1987); Hand v. Central Transp., Inc., 779
F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 758 F.2d 654 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985); Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d
1523 (6th Cir. 1983); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 461
U.S. 940 (1983); Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981). Judge
Jones cast conservative votes in Peck v. General Motors Corp., 894 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.
1990) (per curiam); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 (6th
Cir. 1988); Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1986); Misco, Inc.
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1986); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co.,
738 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1984); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enters., Inc.,
628 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
234. Judge Boochever cast liberal votes in United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456
(9th Cir. 1988); Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d
477 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989); Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co.,
729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1197 (1985); Parks v. Watson, 716
F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 472 U.S. 284 (1985);
Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. Elaine
Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1983); Northrop Corp. v, McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Chipanno v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 702 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1983). Judge Boochever cast conservative
votes in Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A., 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987); Barry
v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839 (9th
Cir. 1986); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d
1400 (9th Cir. 1986); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762 F.2d 1374
(9th Cir. 1985); Fine v. Barry & Enright Prods., 731 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 881 (1984); Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347
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Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit (ten liberal votes in eighteen cases)," s
Stephanie Seymour of the Tenth Circuit (ten liberal votes in eighteen
cases)," 6 and Thomas Clark of the Eleventh Circuit (five liberal votes in
ten cases).3 7 Five Carter appointees participating in at least ten non-
(9th Cir. 1983); Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 704 F.2d 1449 (9th
Cir.), cer. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
235. Judge Reinhardt cast liberal votes in Arizona v. Standard Oil Co., 906 F.2d 432
(9th Cir. 1990), cer denied, III S. Ct. 2274 (1991); USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); The Jeanery,
Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842
F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990); Southwest Marine, Inc. v.
Campbell Indus., 811 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); LaSalvia v.
United Dairymen of Ariz., 804 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 928
(1987); Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 796 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.), amended,
806 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 732 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d
1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983); Aurora Enters., Inc. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 688 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1982). Judge Reinhardt cast conservative votes in
Trans World Airlines v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990);
Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988); T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Catlin v.
Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986); Calculators Haw., Inc. v.
Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1983); Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885
(9th Cir. 1982); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 681 F.2d 594 (9th
Cir. 1982); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
236. Judge Seymour cast liberal votes in Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City,
Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2168 (1990); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639
(10th Cir. 1987); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738
F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool
Indus., Inc., 732 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984); Black Gold, Ltd.
v. Rockwool Indus., 729 F.2d 676, supplemented, 732 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 854 (1984); Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc.,
703 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840
(10th Cir. 1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir.
1980) (en banc); Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383 (10th
Cir. 1980). Judge Seymour cast conservative votes in Kaw Valley Elec. Coop. Co. v.
Kansas Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 872 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Wyoming Tight
Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990);
Colorado ex rel. Colo. Attorney Gen. v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 833 F.2d 867 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Bright v. Moss Ambulance Serv., Inc., 824
F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1987); Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722 (10th Cir.
1987); Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc., 806 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1986);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, modified, 793 F.2d 1171
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986); United States v. Metropolitan Enters., Inc.,
728 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1984); Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 721 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983).
237. Judge Clark cast liberal votes in Key Enters. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990); Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530
(11th Cir. 1987); Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1985); Port Terminal &
Warehousing Co. v. John S. James Co., 695 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1983); Jefferson County
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981) (dissent),
rev'd, 460 U.S. 150 (1983). Judge Clark cast conservative votes in Royal Crown Cola Co.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 887 F.2d 1480 (1 1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3258 (1990);
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immunity cases favored liberal outcomes in 40 to 49 percent of their
votes-Sam Ervin of the Fourth Circuit (four liberal votes in ten
cases),23 Reynaldo Garza of the Fifth Circuit (seven liberal votes in six-
teen cases),2 39 Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit (eight liberal votes in
nineteen cases),2' ° Theodore McMillian of the Eighth Circuit (twelve lib-
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (1989) (dissent), amended, 893 F.2d 293
(11th Cir.), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 401 (1990); United States v. Georgia Waste Sys., Inc., 731
F.2d 1580 (11th Cir. 1984); Bill Beasley Farms, Inc. v. Hubbard Farms, 695 F.2d 1341
(11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
238. Judge Ervin cast liberal votes in Faulkner Advertising Assocs. v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktien-
gesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Interna-
tional Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1986); Metrix
Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 716 F.2d 245 (1983), appeal after
remand, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). Judge Ervin
cast conservative votes in Eastern Publishing & Advertising, Inc. v. Chesapeake Publish-
ing & Advertising, Inc., 831 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 492 U.S. 913 (1989);
Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir.
1987); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1050 (1987); Jays Foods, Inc. v. National Classification Comm., 1986-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) % 67,298 (4th Cir. 1986); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Cooper v. Forsyth County
Hosp. Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986).
239. Judge Garza cast liberal votes in Powers v. Nassau Dev. Corp., 753 F.2d 457 (5th
Cir. 1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985); National Indep.
Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital
Serv. Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984); Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1053 (1986); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Jot-Em-Down Store (Jeds) Inc. v. Cotter & Co., 651 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1981). Judge Garza cast conservative votes in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 855 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1988); Northern Miss. Communications, Inc. v.
Jones, 792 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1986); Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 749 F.2d 241
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985); Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage
Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled, International Woodworkers of Am. v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986); Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion
Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983); Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.,
694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983); Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d
308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982); Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors
Corp., 637 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
240. Judge Merritt cast liberal votes in County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d
839 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3235, 3236 (1990); Guzowski v. Hartman, 840
F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1988); Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir.
1983); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
982 (1982); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Costner
v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978); Rubbermaid, Inc. v. FTC, 575 F.2d
1169 (6th Cir. 1978). Judge Merritt cast conservative votes in Riverview Invs., Inc. v.
Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
151 (1990); Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th
Cir. 1989); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1989) (concurrence),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 853 F.2d
458 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1015 (1989); Blount Fin. Servs. v. Walter E.
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, P.C.,
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eral votes in 27 cases),24 1 and Warren Ferguson of the Ninth Circuit
(four liberal votes in ten cases).242 A single Reagan judge, Harry
Welford of the Sixth Circuit (four liberal votes in ten cases),243 voted in
779 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating Co., 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.) (concurrence), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984);
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983);
Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1982); Bell v.
Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981) (dissent).
241. Judge McMiflian cast liberal votes in HJ., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.,
867 F.2d 1531 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d
242 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 51 (1989); National Farmers' Org. v. Associ-
ated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1988), cer. denied, 489 U.S. 1081,
amended, 878 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1989); Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate
Co., 816 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1987) (concurrence); United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 769
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery
Ass'n, 736 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984); Sun Newspapers, Inc. v.
Omaha World-Herald Co., 713 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Battle v. Watson,
712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (dissent), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984);
Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (dissent), cent
denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Alexander v. National Farmers' Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980).
Judge McMillian cast conservative votes in White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 845
F.2d 1497 (8th Cir. 1988); Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc. 816 F.2d 1248 (8th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 809 F.2d 480 (8th Cir.), cen. denied, 484
U.S. 822 (1987); Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1986);
McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d
484 (8th Cir. 1985); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); Trace X Chem.,
Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 872 (1984); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983);
Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Green v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 692 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.
1982); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam); SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981);
Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981).
242. Judge Ferguson cast liberal votes in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984); Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 472 U.S. 284
(1985); Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983); Aurora
Enters., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 688 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1982). Judge Ferguson
cast conservative votes in Souza v. Estate of Bishop, 821 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1987); Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert dis-
missed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw.,
Inc., 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987); California Glazed Prods., Inc. v. Burns & Russell
Co., 708 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); JBL Enters., Inc. v.
Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); THI-
Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1980).
243. Judge Wellford cast liberal votes in Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson
Co., 917 F.2d 1413 (6th Cir. 1990); Allied Accessories & Auto Parts Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 901 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1990); Chiropractic Coop. Ass'n v. American
Medical Ass'n, 867 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989); Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National
Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cen. denied, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).
Judge Weliford cast conservative votes in International Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler
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ten or more non-immunity cases and endorsed liberal outcomes at least
40 percent of the time.
Although a substantial number of Carter appointees have accumulated
decidedly conservative voting records, relatively few Reagan appointees
have displayed demonstrably liberal voting tendencies. This suggests a
basic difference between the Carter and Reagan judicial selection
processes. The Carter selection process generated a significant number of
appointees who proved to be antitrust conservatives, but Reagan judicial
screening techniques seem to have largely succeeded in eliminating can-
didates with strong preferences for expansive antitrust intervention.
Eleven of the 47 Carter judges (23.4 percent) who voted in ten or more
non-immunity cases cast liberal votes at least 40 percent of the time,
compared to one of 18 Reagan judges (5.5 percent) who met the ten deci-
sions minimum. Its judicial selection process may have endorsed some
nominees who were only moderately skeptical of antitrust and other
forms of economic regulation, but the Reagan Administration seems
more systematically to have excluded candidates who were likely to be
decidedly sympathetic toward economic regulation, including antitrust
intervention. 2'
That Reagan Administration judicial screening did not invariably yield
antitrust and regulation skeptics is evident in the voting records of Judge
Weliford and a handful of Reagan judges who have participated in a
smaller number of non-immunity cases. Three Reagan appointees who
voted in more than five but fewer than ten non-immunity decisions fa-
vored liberal outcomes at least 40 percent of the time: Lawrence Pierce
of the Second Circuit (three liberal votes in seven cases),245 Edward
Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1989) (concurrence), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1783 (1990);
Axis S.p.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 83 (1989);
Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1988); L.B.
Cleveland, Inc. v. Bluestone, 820 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); City of Cleve-
land v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1984); Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1036 (1984).
244. Professor William Page discusses judicial decisionmaking in antitrust in terms of
the degree to which a judge accepts a "constrained vision [that] sees human beings as
limited in their capabilities, and gives great weight to the accumulated decisions of many
individuals as reflected in 'spontaneous' institutions like the market." Page, supra note 4,
at 1300. He observes that "the Chicago approach reflects the influence of the constrained
vision, particularly in the presumption of self-interested, maximizing behavior, and the
idea that wealth maximization is the unintended but predictable outcome of open mar-
kets." Id. The absence of substantial numbers of Reagan appointees with strong prefer-
ences for antitrust intervention is consistent with Professor Page's conclusion that "[b]oth
the appointments process and the greater popular acceptance of the judgments of the
markets have made the judiciary more reflective of the constrained vision." Id.
245. Judge Pierce cast liberal votes in Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional
Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc.
v. Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984). Judge Pierce
cast conservative votes in United States Football League v. National Football League,
842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
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Becker of the Third Circuit (five liberal votes in eight cases),246 and Rob-
ert Chapman of the Fourth Circuit (three liberal votes in six cases).' 7
As they vote in more antitrust cases over time, these and other Reagan
appointees may emerge as a non-trivial subset of Reagan judges with
comparatively moderate or liberal antitrust preferences. 24
The data on individual Reagan appointee voting reveal that, while few
Reagan appointees are antitrust liberals, it would be hazardous for liti-
gants to assume automatically that all Reagan judges singlemindedly
favor conservative outcomes in deciding antitrust cases. This caveat is
reinforced by examining specific cases decided by panels that included
Reagan judges. The cases in this survey provide several grounds for cau-
tion in accepting hypotheses that attribute to Reagan appointees a mono-
lithic, laissez faire conservatism that favors adoption of permissive
antitrust standards.
One basis for caution is that Reagan judges sometimes acquiesce in
opinions that openly repudiate Chicago School views. A useful illustra-
tion is McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 49 In McGahee, a unani-
mous Eleventh Circuit panel reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant on predatory pricing claims brought under
the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act-2' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit panel consisted of Seybourn Lynne, a Truman appointee and district
judge sitting by designation; Joseph Hatchett, a Carter appointee; and
J.L. Edmondson, a Reagan appointee. Judge Lynne's majority opinion
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); Fairdale Farms, Inc. v.
Yankee Milk, Inc., 715 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
246. Judge Becker cast liberal votes in Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nexnours
& Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987) (dissent), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Weiss v.
York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Englert v.
City of McKeesport, 736 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1984); Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ.,
697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982). Judge Becker cast conservative votes in Nanavati v. Burdette
Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1988), cerz. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989);
Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986) (dis-
sent); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cen. denied,
469 U.S. 854 (1984).
247. Judge Chapman cast liberal votes in Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz
Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988);
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 716 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.
1983); Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribs., Inc., 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
Judge Chapman cast conservative votes in Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1120 (1990); Southern Pines Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1987); White v. Rockingham
Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987).
248. One such Reagan appointee is Carol Mansmann, whose opinions in distribution
restraints cases have adopted positions largely favorable to plaintiffs. See J.F. Feeser, Inc.
v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1313
(1991); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.
1986).
249. 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
250. See iL at 1491.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
made several observations that, by the logic of the conservative court-
packing hypothesis, one would expect Reagan appointees to dispute
strongly. Judge Lynne downplayed the role of economics as a basis for
framing liability rules;2"' emphasized the need to give effect to the Con-
gress's "political... purpose of curbing the power some individuals and
corporations had over the economy"; 252 and endorsed reliance upon sub-
jective expressions of predatory intent in assessing the validity of the de-
fendant's pricing conduct.2 ' These remarks drew no rebuttal from
Judge Edmondson-a silence bespeaking acceptance or tolerance of de-
monstrably liberal antitrust views.
Opinions authored by Reagan appointees offer more direct indications
that Reagan judges differ among themselves in antitrust preferences and
analytical perspectives. Some Reagan judges have declined to rely upon
current economic learning to qualify or ignore heavily criticized, but not
overruled, Supreme Court decisions from the 1960s. In United States v.
American Cyanamid Co.,254 a unanimous Second Circuit panel including
two Reagan appointees (Richard Cardamone and Lawrence Pierce) re-
viewed a district court decision to terminate a consent decree that com-
pelled American Cyanamid to buy part of its manufacturing inputs from
other chemical producers. With the approval of the Reagan Administra-
tion's Department of Justice, American Cyanamid had asked the district
court to vacate the decree, which sought, among other ends, to correct
perceived foreclosure problems arising from a vertical merger.255 In
granting the termination, the district court observed that the anti-foreclo-
sure safeguards were no longer necessary because "[c]ontemporary eco-
nomic theory recognizes that vertical integration may foster corporate
efficiency and enhance competition in the market place. 25
6
The Second Circuit reversed the termination of the consent decree,
ruling that the district court had failed to evaluate the termination in
light of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States257 and other cases establishing
criteria for determining the antitrust legality of vertical mergers.25 8
Judge Pierce's opinion for the court acknowledged that "Brown Shoe and
its progeny have been the subject of considerable criticism by academi-
cians who believe these cases apply overly harsh standards in assessing
251. Judge Lynne stated that "[als a social science built on assumptions and statistics,
economics is subject to the disparagement attributed by Mark Twain in his Autobiography
to B. Disraeli: 'There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.'" Id. at
1496 n.19.
252. Id. at 1497-98.
253. See id. at 1496, 1500, 1504-05.
254. 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983).
255. See id. at 559.
256. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 556 F. Supp. 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y.) (em-
phasis in original), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
257. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
258. American Cyanamid, 719 F.2d at 566-67.
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the legality of vertical mergers." 259 The court added that "these cases
nonetheless continue to constitute the current state of the law as pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court, which circuit and district courts are
bound to follow. '" 26  Judge Pierce concluded that "it was error to apply
'contemporary economic theory' to the extent it may be distinct from
precedent, and fail to apply the standard framework of analysis."'261
A similar, more recent example of this phenomenon is Alan's of At-
lanta, Ina v. Minolta Corp.26 2 In Alan's, a unanimous Eleventh Circuit
panel including two Reagan appointees (Emmett Cox and Jesse Esch-
bach, sitting by designation from the Seventh Circuit) reversed a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant on a variety of Robinson-Patman
Act price discrimination claims.263 Judge Eschbach's opinion reviewed
academic and judicial debate over the proper interpretation of the com-
petitive injury requirement of Section 2(a) of the anti-price discrimina-
tion statute.2 "4 Among other sources, he quoted Robert Bork's
observation in the Antitrust Paradox that competitive injury for antitrust
purposes occurs only when the conduct in question has the effect of re-
stricting output and raising prices.265 Judge Eschbach then stated that
"[j]udicial precedent... suggests that in the [Robinson-Patman Act] the
meaning of competition is not so narrow, nor the gap between an injury
to competition and an injury to competitors so wide. ' 266 He concluded
this discussion by observing that "[W]hen confronted with contemporary
economic argument on the one hand and judicial precedent on the other,
we feel, unlike those of a more activist bent, see, eg., R. Bork, [The Anti-
trust Paradox] 36, that economic argument is not ultimately controlling;
judicial precedent is.,, 267
American Cyanamid and Alan's indicate that one type of Reagan ap-
pointee conservatism entails a commitment to decide cases on the basis of
precedent, however discredited such precedent might be in the eyes of
economically-oriented commentators.2 68 This form of conservatism is
significant, given the substantial number of Supreme Court decisions
259. Id. at 567 n.9 (citing IV P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 00-19 (1980); R.
Bork, supra note 61, at 225-45 (1978); Y. Brozen, Concentration, Mergers, and Public
Policy 402-04 (1982)).
260. Id. at 567.
261. Id. The Second Circuit then instructed the district court "to apply the factors for
analyzing the legality of a vertical merger set forth by Brown Shoe" and other vertical
merger decisions. Id.
262. 903 F.2d 1414 (11th Cir. 1990).
263. See it at 1416.
264. See id. at 1417.
265. See id at 1418 n.6 (citing R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 122 (1978)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Cf. Panel Discussion, Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, in Antitrust
Policy in Transition: The Convergence of Law and Economics 5, 15 (E. Fox & J. Halver-
son eds. 1984) (Judge Robert Bork: "If the economic analysis of the Supreme Court was
part of its rationale in deciding the case, then I think the lower court must adopt the same
rationale, although it is free to be critical of it in the process.").
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from the 1960s and early 1970s that adopted expansive liability standards
and have not been overruled.2 69 Beyond a sense of duty to apply prece-
dent, fidelity to established legal doctrine also may stem from discomfort
in relying on theoretical economic propositions to dispose of cases posing
factually complex and difficult issues of industry analysis. Such hesita-
tion on the part of some Reagan judges is evident when the court of
appeals reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendant on the basis of an austere factual record.270 Thus, the conserva-
tism of some Reagan appointees may manifest itself in adherence to
precedent of questionable economic wisdom, suspicion of abstract eco-
nomic theory as a decisionmaking tool, and distaste for resolving difficult
issues on a spare factual foundation.
Variations in the conservatism attributed to prominent Reagan ap-
pointees also has emerged in decisions involving federal government
challenges to mergers. For merger cases contained in this survey, no
judges treated the federal enforcement agencies more favorably than
Richard Posner and Robert Bork. Judge Posner was the author of three
opinions sustaining Justice Department and FTC challenges to acquisi-
tions.271 In Hospital Corp. of America v. Federal Trade Commission,272
269. See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
270. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2823 (1991), is instructive. In Image, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing a tying claim involving Ko-
dak's sale of photocopiers and micrographic equipment. As a condition of providing
replacement parts, Kodak required its customers to agree not to use the services of in-
dependent repair and service organizations. Kodak had argued, without contradiction
from the plaintiffs, that it lacked market power in the market for copiers or micrographic
equipment. See id. at 616 & n.3. Without market power in the interbrand market, Ko-
dak contended, the company could not charge supracompetitive prices for replacement
parts or service without losing new placements or inducing existing customers to switch
to products offered by rival suppliers. See id. at 616-17.
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's ruling. The majority opin-
ion by Judge Charles Wiggins, a Reagan appointee, said the court could not uphold the
summary judgment on the "theoretical basis" of Kodak's interbrand competition argu-
ment. Id. at 617. Judge Wiggins noted that the court of appeals "lack[ed] the benefit of
the district court's consideration of the market power issue" and was "presented with a
record that was not fully developed through discovery on this issue." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). Judge Wiggins then described the court's reluctance to give full effect to Kodak's
"theoretical" argument without a fuller factual framework:
[Miarket imperfections can keep economic theories about how consumers will
act from mirroring reality.... While appellants have not conducted a market
analysis and pin-pointed specific imperfections in the copier and micrographic
markets, a requirement that they do so in order to withstand summary judg-
ment would elevate theory above reality.
Id. (citation omitted). Later in the opinion, Judge Wiggins commented that "there is
logical appeal in Kodak's theory that it could not have monopoly power (let alone market
power) in the service market since it lacks economic power in the interbrand markets.
But in light of appellants' evidence we cannot say that this theory mirrors reality." Id. at
621. Judge Richard Chambers, an Eisenhower appointee, joined the Wiggins opinion,
and Judge Clifford Wallace, a Nixon appointee, dissented.
271. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1280 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 11 S. Ct. 295 (1990); FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 902 (7th Cir.
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Judge Posner's majority opinion sustained an FTC administrative deci-
sion that compelled dissolution of a hospital merger.3" As an academic,
Judge Posner had attacked the FTC's performance as an antitrust en-
forcement agency;274 in Hospital Corp. he emphasized the deferential na-
ture of the court's review of the FTC's assessment of the evidence and
lauded the painstaking quality of the FTC's analysis. 2" Although
neither case involved review of the results of administrative adjudication,
the tone of Judge Posner's majority opinions in United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp.276 and Federal Trade Commission v. Elders Grain.
Inc"277 also bespeak a willingness to give federal enforcement officials the
benefit of the doubt concerning the soundness of their analytical method-
ology and the wisdom of their decision to prosecute.27 Judge Bork par-
ticipated in a single merger case on the D.C. Circuit, but his majority
opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. PPG Industries2 79 is noteworthy
for its willingness to sustain the enforcement decision and analysis of a
federal agency Bork had denounced before coming to the bench.'
The deference explicitly and implicitly given the federal government in
the Bork and Posner merger opinions contrasts sharply with the drub-
bings that Judge Alex Kozinski, a Reagan appointee, and Judge Clarence
Thomas, a Bush appointee and nominee to the Supreme Court, recently
administered to the Justice Department in, respectively, United States v.
Syufy Enterprises281 and United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.1 2 In style
and content, Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Sy-
1989); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1383 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
272. 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
273. See id. at 1393.
274. See Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. ChL L Rev. 47, 47, 54-61
(1969).
275. See Hospital Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1384-86.
276. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
277. 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989).
278. In Rockford, Judge Posner described the Justice Department's burden in the fol-
lowing terms:
IT]he government is not required to await the maturation of the relevant schol-
arship in order to establish a prima facie case .... The principles of civil proce-
dure do not require that the plaintiff make an airtight case, only that his case
satisfy some minimum threshold of persuasiveness and be better than the de-
fendant's case. The government showed large market shares in a plausibly de-
fined market in an industry more prone than many to collusion. The
defendants responded with conjectures about the motives of nonprofits, and
other will o' the wisps, that the district judge was free to reject, and did.
898 F.2d at 1286 (citation omitted). See also Elders Grain, 868 F.2d at 906
("[Clonsidering the haste with which the FTC was compelled to act by the defendants'
decision to accelerate the acquisition, the [Federal Trade] Commission cannot be faulted
for having failed to calculate market shares in capacity as well as output terms.").
279. 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
280. See id at 1506. For Judge Bork's acid critique of the FTC's antitrust work, see R.
Bork, supra note 61, at 48, 252.
281. 903 F.2d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 1990).
282. 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
uf, dispatched the government's case in a torrent of ridicule. Beyond
serving as a showcase for its author's knowledge of movie titles,283 the
Syufy majority opinion depicts the Justice Department's decision to pros-
ecute as virtually irrational.2" Such a characterization is striking if only
because the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust who decided to at-
tack the merger in question (Douglas Ginsburg)285 is not ordinarily asso-
ciated with an indiscriminate hostility to mergers. Judge Thomas'
majority opinion in Baker Hughes lacks Judge Kozinski's flamboyance,
but it is equally unforgiving of the government's decision to prosecute.286
Judges Kozinski, Posner, and Thomas undoubtedly share many common
conservative perspectives, but litigants appearing before them in the fu-
ture would be unwise to regard their attitudes in government merger
cases as fungible.
A final qualification to the monolithic conception of laissez faire con-
servatism on the part of Reagan appointees is that the strong economic
orientation of some Reagan judges sometimes yields expansion, rather
than narrowing, of the scope of antitrust intervention. One example is
Illinois ex reL Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,287 in which a
divided en banc Seventh Circuit panel2"8 recognized a limited exception
to the principle of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.289
and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois2" that precludes indirect purchasers
from seeking damages attributable to illegal overcharges. Writing for the
Seventh Circuit majority, Judge Posner held that the indirect purchaser
restriction did not embrace overcharges associated with certain cost-plus
natural gas supply contracts.2 91 Economically-based analytical tech-
283. Hidden in Judge Kozinski's Syuj5, opinion are the titles of over 200 films. See
Movie Movie, ABA J., Aug. 1990, at 20.
284. Judge Kozinski observed:
It is a tribute to the state of competition in America that the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice has found no worthier target than this paper tiger
on which to expend limited taxpayer resources. Yet we cannot help but wonder
whether bringing a lawsuit like this, and pursuing it doggedly through 27
months of pretrial proceedings, about two weeks of trial and now the full dis-
tance on appeal, really serves the interests of free competition.
Syuf,, 903 F.2d at 672 (footnote omitted).
285. See United States v. Syufy Enters., [1980-1988 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 5,086 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1986).
286. Judge Thomas stated that "The government does not maximize its scarce re-
sources when it allows statistics alone to trigger its ponderous enforcement machinery."
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 992 n.13. Immediately afterwards Judge Thomas added a
quotation from Judge Kozinski raising the same question about the decision to prosecute
in Syufy. See id.
287. 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
288. The Panhandle majority consisted of five Reagan appointees (Coffey, Flaum,
Kanne, Posner, and Ripple) and one Carter appointee (Cudahy). The dissent consisted of
two Johnson appointees (Cummings and Fairchild), a Ford appointee (Bauer), and a
Reagan appointee (Manion).
289. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
290. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
291. Panhandle, 852 F.2d at 899.
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niques figured prominently in Judge Posner's discussion of the operation
of rate-of-return regulatory schemes and in his assessment of the eco-
nomic incentives to sue, confronting, respectively, a regulated gas distri-
bution firm and residential consumers of natural gas.2" The
economically-oriented analysis that Judge Posner's critics associate ex-
clusively with pro-defendant outcomes was instrumental in surmounting
the barrier imposed by Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick-an outcome
that often has eluded state governments seeking to sue as parens patriae
on behalf of indirect purchasers under the federal antitrust laws.293
C. Qualitative Significance of Reagan Appointments
A mere recital of voting statistics understates the influence of the Rea-
gan appointments in shaping antitrust doctrine. In a number of in-
stances, the Reagan Administration looked to individuals with long
experience in legal instruction to fill vacancies on the courts of appeals.
This brought to the bench several distinguished academics equipped with
a coherent, informing vision about the correct course for antitrust policy.
By virtue of their extensive scholarship and study in the area, former
academics such as Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas Ginsburg,
Richard Posner, and Ralph Winter were well positioned to attempt to
recast antitrust doctrine along conservative lines. Since 1981 several of
these individuals have written important opinions that have laid the
foundation for a narrowing of the reach of antitrust doctrine.219
Robert Bork's tenure on the District of Columbia Circuit illustrates
the point. Judge Bork wrote few antitrust opinions during his service on
the court, but one decision-Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Ina 295-is significant in several ways. First, it represents an im-
portant effort to shift the boundaries of horizontal restraints doctrine. In
Rothery, Judge Bork stated that restraints ancillary to an integration of
economic activities are not illegal per se and are to be evaluated by rule
of reason.296 Judge Bork's opinion concluded that recent Supreme Court
292. Id at 895-99.
293. In Kansas & Mo. v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990), for example,
the Court refused to apply the cost-plus exception to the indirect purchaser rule in a
parens patriae suit ifed by various state governments on behalf of residential customers of
natural gas. See id. at 2818.
294. An abbreviated list of noteworthy examples would include A.A. Poultry Farms,
Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989) (opinion by Judge Easter-
brook), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (opinion by Judge Posner), cerL denied, 480
U.S. 934 (1987); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (opinion by Judge Bork), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros., Inc. v.
Forest City Enters. Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Judge Easterbrook);
United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (opinion by Judge
Winter).
295. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
296. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 229-30.
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decisions had "effectively overruled" '29 7 United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc,29 which had displayed a categorical hostility toward horizontal
price and market division restrictions, regardless of the role such restric-
tions might play in establishing and maintaining an efficiency-enhancing
integration of activities. In adopting this position, Rothery strongly en-
courages an efficiency-based assessment of horizontal restraints that fall
outside the bounds of conventional bid-rigging or market allocation
schemes.
Rothery is interesting not only for its substantive outcome, but also for
its intellectual lineage. Judge Bork's majority opinion distilled ideas he
had pursued in scholarly writing and academic debate during his career
as a member of the Yale Law School faculty.299 Rothery's operative ele-
ments are borrowed largely from the analysis Judge Bork had spelled out
in his 1978 book, Antitrust Paradox. The opinion placed previous judi-
cial treatments of horizontal restraints in their historical and intellectual
context, and demonstrated how recent Supreme Court decisions had de-
parted from the approach Topco endQrsed in 1972. The result is a power-
ful, succinct statement of a reformed analytical framework for evaluating
horizontal restraints. The sophistication of the analysis and the persua-
siveness of its approach were certifying marks of the author's considera-
ble command of the field.
Rothery-like opinions are not accidental in antitrust or in any other
field. They place a premium on the author's intellectual capital and ex-
perience. President Reagan's selection of distinguished academics to sit
on the courts of appeals yielded jurists with the necessary reservoir of
ideas to make the process of opinion-writing an important vehicle for
adjusting the boundaries of legal doctrine. The intellectual capital of
these appointees supplies a significant tool for shaping the thinking of
other members of the same court, as informal and formal discussion of
cases affords opportunities to advocate adoption of the academic's pre-
ferred analytical approach. Depending on her personality and persua-
siveness, the former academic may be seen by colleagues as a valuable
repository of insights and approaches to solving difficult problems. Thus,
a president committed to fostering change in existing judicial doctrines of
any sort is wise to choose judges who possess the informing intellectual
vision, analytical tools, and technical command of subject matter that
can produce influential opinions.
IV. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND ANTITRUST IN THE 1990s
The conclusions one can draw from reviewing experience with Carter
and Reagan appointees raise the question of how the Bush administra-
297. Id. at 229.
298. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
299. See Kovacic, The Rule of Reason: D.C. Circuit Adopts Judge Bork's Analysis,
Legal Times, Oct. 6, 1986, at 20-21.
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tion's nominations will affect the judiciary's collective approach toward
antitrust policy. From January 1989 through December 1990, the Bush
Administration accounted for twenty-two new judges on the courts of
appeals."ca Although this number is relatively small, the pace of nomina-
tions has increased following a period of minimal activity during the first
six months of the Bush Administration.3"' Forthcoming appointments
promise to be particularly important for the future of antitrust policy and
other forms of economic regulation.
If the Bush Administration accelerates the pace of appointments and
secures confirmation of its nominees,3" the cumulative impact of Reagan
and Bush appointments could affect the disposition of economic regula-
tion cases to an extent not yet apparent in decisions since 1981.303 Rea-
gan and Bush judges now hold parity with non-Reagan judges or
constitute narrow majorities on most of the federal courts of appeals.' °
If one assumes what could prove to be an unrealistic condition-that
Reagan and Bush judges will serve long terms3 5-the Bush appoint-
ments could create supermajorities of Reagan-Bush judges by the end of
1992. It appears likely that Reagan-Bush nominees will account for be-
tween 65 and 70 percent of all federal court of appeals judges by the end
of 1992.3°
300. See Moran, In His Own Image, Legal Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 15.
301. See Pelham, Progress Seen in Filling Federal Bench, Legal Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at
1; see also Glaberson, Delays in Filling Vacancies Create U.& Court Backlogs, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at B3, col. 5 (describing delays in judicial appointments early in
Bush Administration); Marcus, Federal Judgeship Vacancies Pile Up As Administration
Enters Fifth Month, Wash. Post, May 23, 1989, at A13, col. 1 (same).
302. Few Bush nominees have failed to gain confirmation. See Wermiel, Controversy
Brews Behind High Marks Given to Bush Nominees for Judgeships, Wall St. J., May 13,
1991, at B7C, col. 3. A rare exception is Kenneth Ryskamp, a federal district judge
whose nomination to the Eleventh Circuit was rejected by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee in April 1991. See Barrett & Hayes, Senate Panel Kills a Nomination By Bush to
Atlanta Appeals Court, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1991, at B8, col. 1.
303. Through December 31, 1990, there were 126 vacancies on the federal district
courts and courts of appeals-approximately fifteen percent of the federal judiciary. The
Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 established 85 of these positions. See Moran, supra note
300, at 14.
304. This condition exists for the following circuits: District of Columbia, First, Sec-
ond, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth. See Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters
Conservative Trend in Courts, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
305. Before the recent increase in judicial salaries, many commentators had warned
that mass defections from the federal bench might occur if Congress did not raise com-
pensation for judges substantially. See Raven, Maintaining a Quality Judiciary: The Need
for Adequate Compensation, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 8; Grey, How to Guarantee a
Mediocre Judiciary, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1989, at A27, col. 2; Bork, Miserable Wages
Miserable Leaders, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1988, at A39, col. 2. In 1989 Congress ap-
proved a new salary scale that establishes a ceiling of $132,700 for court of appeals
judges. See Rehnquist Lauds Raise for Judges, Wash. Post, Jan 1, 1991, at A21, col. 1.
This step may discourage departures for the time being. However, many court of appeals
judges have high professional opportunity costs for remaining on the bench. It remains
possible that the durability of a Reagan-Bush judicial revolution may diminish if signifi-
cant, periodic salary increases are not forthcoming.
306. See Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying On a Tradition, 74
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Preliminary evidence suggests that President Bush will nominate judi-
cial candidates with roughly the same bundle of ideological preferences
held by Reagan appointees.3"7 Creating Reagan-Bush supermajorities
with narrow antitrust preferences on the individual courts of appeals
would increase the likelihood that two or more Reagan-Bush judges
would sit on any individual panel. This could shape the disposition of
antitrust cases in two important ways. First, it might raise the likelihood
that a panel would favor a conservative outcome in any single case. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more significant, it could alter the stated basis on
which a panel embraces a conservative result. Where they constitute a
majority on any given panel and hold a supermajority within a given
circuit, Reagan-Bush judges might endorse more extreme positions in
writing majority opinions. A tendency to adopt extreme positions would
flow from the reduced need to achieve consensus with more moderate
judges on three-judge panels and in en banc deliberations. Thus, the
manner in which the Bush Administration fills existing and forthcoming
court of appeals vacancies could exert an increasingly pronounced influ-
ence on the course of antitrust policy.30 8
The voting behavior of Reagan-Bush appointees will be significant in
large part because appellate judges will confront an increase in cases that
seek to push antitrust doctrine and policy beyond the bounds established
in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. 309 Several recent developments have
Judicature 294, 306 (Apr.-May 1991); Kamen & Marcus, A Chance to Deepen Stamp on
Courts, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 4. Assuming that President Bush serves a
second term and continues historical rates of appointments, Reagan-Bush appointees
could account for 80 to 90 percent of the entire federal judiciary by 1996.
307. See R. Carp & R. Stidham, supra note 18, at 119-21; Goldman, supra note 16, at
329; Goldman, supra note 306, at 305-06; Marcus, supra note 304, at AI, col. 3; Moran,
supra note 300, at 15; Lewis, Bush Travels Reagan's Course in Naming Judges, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 2; Johnston, Bush Appears Set to Follow Reagan by
Putting Conservatives on Bench, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1989, at B5, col. 1; Kamen & Mar-
cus, supra note 306; Abramson, Conservative Legal Groups Plan Efforts to Keep Bush
Administration on Reagan's Judicial Path, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1988, at A18, col. 1.
308. It should be noted that the results from the 751 non-immunity cases in this survey
do not indicate a difference in voting patterns when Carter or Reagan judges constituted
a panel majority. In 195 cases, Carter appointees either constituted a majority in an en
banc proceeding or held two or more seats on a three-judge panel. Fifty-six of these cases
(28.7 percent) reached liberal outcomes, and 139 decisions (71.3 percent) endorsed con-
servative results. By comparison in 809 total non-immunity votes, Carter appointees en-
dorsed liberal outcomes 249 times (30.8 percent) and favored conservative positions 560
times (69.2 percent).
Reagan judges held majorities in en banc deliberations or on three-judge panels in 108
cases. Nineteen decisions (17.6 percent) supported liberal outcomes, and 89 cases (82.4
percent) endorsed conservative results. In the total non-immunity data set, Reaganjudges cast 487 votes, with 86 votes (17.7 percent) taking liberal positions and 401 votes
(82.3 percent) endorsing conservative outcomes.
309. Cf. Flynn, supra note 9, at 886:
The direction taken by the Bush administration in its judicial appointments and
congressional reaction to them will have a great influence over the next decade
in determining whether antitrust policy will remain a significant element in de-
termining economic policy and the rights of consumers and competitors or
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created possibilities for more expansive public and private antitrust en-
forcement. First, new leaders at the Department of Justice and the FTC
have displayed greater enforcement activism. 310 Compared to their Rea-
gan-appointed predecessors, Bush Administration enforcement officials
have adopted more stringent policies for, among other practices, merg-
ers311 and distribution restraints.312 Although the actual extent of devia-
tion from Reagan antitrust preferences during the Bush Administration
ultimately may prove to be modest,313 the center of gravity of federal
enforcement has moved to the left of its equilibrium of the Reagan era.
Second, continuing a pattern that emerged during the Reagan presi-
dency, state attorneys general have expanded their antitrust enforcement
activities.314 States such as New York and California have become par-
ticularly active in enforcing federal antitrust prohibitions against merg-
ersat5 and distribution restraints,31 6 two areas in which federal
enforcement waned dramatically during the Reagan administration. Re-
whether it will become a curious backwater largely of historical interest like it
was in the 1920's; of little interest until the next economic disaster such as the
Great Depression of the 1930's undermines the economy.
310. See McDermott, FTC Explores the Limits of Nonmerger Enforcement, 5 Anti.
trust, Summer 1991, at 34, Barrett & Saddler, Two Regulatory Chiefs Stir Up Business-
Under Steiger, FTC Has Ended "No-Go"Stance, Wall St. J., May 16, 1991, at B1, col. 5;
Smart, Psstl The Trustbusters Are Back in Town, Bus. Week, June 25, 1990, at 64; Muf-
son, Return of the Trustbusters?, Wash. Post, June 17, 1990, at HI, col. 1; Barrett, Assis-
tant Attorney General Rill Sends Message To Firms as He Strives to Intensify Antitrust
Effort, Wall St. J., June 13, 1990, at A16, col. 1; Karr & McQueen, Adjusting Course:
Unlike Reagan Aides. Many Bush Officials Expand Regulation, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989,
at Al, col. 1; Nash, More Antitrust Challenges Are Expected Under Bush, N.Y. Tunes,
Nov. 2, 1989, at DI, col. 1.
311. See 60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, 59 Antitrust L.J. 3, 10-13 (1990); Bell & Herfort, Justice, FTC Signal
Tougher Merger Enforcement Standards, Antitrust, Summer 1990, at 5, 5; Rill, Antitrust
Enforcement An Agenda for the 1990's, 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 671, 671 (Nov.
9, 1989); K. Arquit, Speech Before the Cleveland Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
(Dec. 14, 1989) (presentation on merger enforcement policy by Kevin Arquit, Director of
FTC's Bureau of Competition) (on file at the Fordham Law Review).
312. See, e.g., Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 3,011 (FTrC:
June 20, 1991) (consent order prohibiting tying arrangement); Nintendo of Am. Inc., 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 2,968 (FTC: Apr. 10, 1991) (consent order prohibiting resale
price maintenance); Kreepy Krauly USA, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 2,924 (FTC:
Jan. 10, 1991) (consent order prohibiting resale price maintenance); Gerald S. Friedman,
M.D., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCII) 2,811 (FTC: Mar. 23, 1990) (consent order prohibiting
tying arrangement); see also Meier, FTC is Re-Emerging as Watchdog on Prices, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1991, at A16, col. 1 (describing FTC resale price maintenance inquiries).
313. See J. Kwoka, Jr. & L. White, Preface, in The Antitrust Revolution 5 (J. Kwoka,
Jr. & L. White eds. 1989); Interview with Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust, Spring 1989, at 6,
6; Kovacic, Steady Reliever at Antitrust, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at A18, col. 4.
314. See Report from the National Association of Attorneys General--State Antitrust
Enforcement Programs, 58 Antitrust Li. 195 (1989) (symposium); Calvani & Sibarium,
supra note 4, at 208-16; Constantine, Current Antitrust Enforcement Initiatives by State
Attorneys General, 56 Antitrust L.J. 111 (1987); Constantine, An Inside Look at Current
Trends in State Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust, Winter 1987, at 6, 6.
315. See, e.g., Farmer, Introduction: State Merger Enforcement, 58 Antitrust L.J. 221
(1989) (discussing state merger enforcement in 1980s); Constantine, The States' Role in
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cent Supreme Court decisions such as California v. American Stores
Co.a17 have ensured that state governments will continue to play an im-
portant role in vindicating federal antitrust policies.
Third, recent academic literature has featured new, enforcement-ori-
ented theories that directly or indirectly support the revival of liability
theories that had fallen into relative disfavor. 8 One important strand of
this literature proposes stronger efforts to address dominant firm strate-
gic behavior, leveraging, and nonprice predation.3 19 Another strand pro-
vides justifications for antitrust scrutiny of vertical practices such as
resale price maintenance 32° and efforts by firms to deny rivals access to
suppliers or distribution networks. 21 Such theories will equip antitrust
plaintiffs with arguments to persuade courts that efficiency considera-
tions, properly treated, warrant imposing greater antitrust limits upon
certain types of conduct.
Finally, while invoking the new economic literature, plaintiffs also can
try to avail themselves of heavily criticized but still extant Supreme
Court precedents that establish far-reaching liability standards. The con-
servatism in the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence over the past
fifteen years has consisted less of directly loosening liability standards
than of endorsing restrictive evidentiary and standing requirements. 3 22
Challenging National Mergers is Vital, Antitrust, Spring 1989, at 37 (presenting rationale
for state merger enforcement in 1980s).
316. See Brockmeyer, Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force, 58 Antitrust L.J.
215, 216 (1989); Interview with Robert Abrams, New York State Attorney General, Anti-
trust, Summer 1990, at 14, 15.
317. 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990). In American Stores, the Supreme Court upheld the ability
of states to obtain divestiture to remedy violations of federal antitrust laws. See id. at
1866-67.
318. For a summary of this literature, see Baker, supra note 127, at 647-55; see also
Kovacic, supra note 13, at 32-33 (describing institutional forces that contribute to the
development of pro-enforcement antitrust theories).
319. See, e.g., ABA Section on Antitrust Law: Monograph No. 18, Nonprice Preda-
tion Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 7-32 (1991) (describing emerging theories of
nonprice predation) (on file at the Fordham Law Review); Encaoua, Geroski & Jac-
quemin, Strategic Competition and the Persistence of Dominant Firms: A Survey, in New
Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure 55 (J. Stiglitz & G. Mathewson eds.
1986) (describing anticompetitive dominant firm strategic conduct); Kaplow, Extension
of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985) (identifying an-
ticompetitive possibilities of leverage); Ordover & Saloner, Predation, Monopolization,
and Antitrust, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 537 (R. Schmalensee & R. Wil-
lig eds. 1989) (summarizing modern game theory literature and describing its application
to single firm conduct); Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Ri-
vals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986) (discussing use of cost-
raising strategies to handicap competitors); Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 Go.
L.J. 271, 289-93 (1987) (identifying welfare-reducing strategic behavior).
320. See Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New
Antitrust Policy, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 999-1000 (1985); Scherer, The Economics of Verti-
cal Restraints, 52 Antitrust L.J. 687, 707 (1983).
321. See Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers
that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 Am. J. L. & Med. 147, 163 (1988); Salop & Scheffman, Cost-
Raising Strategies, 36 J. Indus. Econ. 19, 19-20 (1987).
322. See Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1540-
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Left intact is what Richard Steuer aptly calls the "mothball fleet" of anti-
trust323-a collection of seemingly dormant cases whose logic or impact
the Court has undercut,32 but whose holdings the Court has not over-
ruled.a Thus, vessels not yet stricken from the mothball fleet's registry
include decisions such as United States v. Von's Grocery," 6 Utah Pie v.
Continental Baking,327 and United States v. Topco Associates, Ina.,32 all
of which contain sweeping prohibitions on conduct that much modem
antitrust jurisprudence and academic commentary have deemed benign
or procompetitive. These and similar decisions remain fair game for liti-
gants seeking to persuade individual federal judges that expansive liabil-
ity rules are appropriate in specific cases. A judge's ideological
preferences easily could be the difference in determining whether such
precedents shall be treated as vital or moribund.
It is unremarkable that the country would experience a resurgence of
antitrust activity. Throughout a century of Sherman Act experience, an-
titrust's strongest revivals have followed periods of comparatively per-
missive enforcement policy.32 9 The preferences of Reagan-Bush
appointees will deeply influence how much the forces for expansion will
succeed in reviving antitrust approaches the Reagan Administration dis-
favored. Among other areas, this is particularly true for the course of
federal enforcement policy.330 Compared to their Reagan predecessors,
41, 1543-52 (1989); Page, supra note 4, at 1278-89; see also Gibbons, Antitrust, Law &
Economic, and Politics, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs., No. 4, at 221-22 (1987) (discussing
impact of Supreme Court decisions that apply "door-closing devices" to dismiss private
antitrust suits).
323. Steuer, Monsanto and the Mothball Fleet of Antitrust, 30 Antitrust Bull. 1, 1
(1985).
324. See Calvani, Future Direction of Antitrust Law Enforcement, 29 Washburn L.J.
364, 365-67 (1990); Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agree-
ment" Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 879, 880 (1980).
325. See Page, supra note 4, at 1223-24.
326. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987), Judge Posner recited the foundations of
Supreme Court horizontal merger jurisprudence (including Von's Grocery) from the
1960s and observed that "[n]one of these decisions has been overruled." Id at 1385.
327. 386 U.S. 685 (1967). In A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881
F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990), Judge Easterbrook noted
that "[n]o case since Utah Pie questions its holding, as opposed to its outlook." IdL at
1405 (emphasis in original).
328. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Twice in recent years the Supreme Court has cited Topco for
the proposition that agreements between competitors to allocate sales territories are ile-
gal per se. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 401, 402-03 (1990); Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Co., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988).
329. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 1140-43; cf. Baker and Blumenthal, Ideological Cy-
cles and Unstable Antitrust Rules, 31 Antitrust Bull. 323, 333 (1986) (observing that anti-
trust populism "continues to enjoy support among academic commentators and within
Congress and the judiciary, and its resurgence simply awaits the right set of political
circumstances" (footnote omitted)).
330. See Sims & Lande, The End of Antitrust--Or a New Beginning?, 31 Antitrust
Bull. 301, 313 (1989).
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Bush appointees to the Justice Department and the FTC have embraced
a more expansive view of the appropriate scope of government antitrust
intervention. At the same time, Bush appointees to the federal bench
appear to share the largely conservative disposition of their Reagan coun-
terparts. Continued nomination of regulation skeptics will mean that the
fruits of expanded federal enforcement programs will face review by
judges with narrower antitrust preferences. Reagan and Bush appointees
who previously have given the government the benefit of the doubt-
perhaps because they believed that the Reagan Administration had prop-
erly constricted the focus of federal enforcement activity-may review
government cases more warily if they become convinced that the govern-
ment is willing to take more chances on antitrust's frontiers.33 ' What the
Bush Administration's invigorated Antitrust Division and FTC give, the
Reagan-Bush judiciary may take away.
CONCLUSION
The federal antitrust system gives federal judges considerable discre-
tion to determine the rules of competition by which businesses operate.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Supreme Court's 1986 deci-
sion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.332 In
Matsushita, the Court invited lower court judges to dismiss antitrust
claims that hinge upon ambiguous circumstantial evidence of conspiracy
or lack economic plausibility. Whether circumstantial evidence is "am-
biguous" or a claim is "economically plausible" are questions whose res-
olution largely depends upon the intuition and preferences of federal
judges. Matsushita displays a bias toward non-intervention, but individ-
ual judges have considerable discretion to determine how deeply its com-
mands will affect the adjudication of each case.333 Outcomes in specific
cases often will depend on a judge's predisposition either to trust or
doubt the curative powers of antitrust intervention.334
In choosing federal judges, the Reagan Administration sought to en-
sure that the discretion inherent in Matsushita and similar cases would be
exercised to disfavor intervention. This Article finds that Reagan/Bush
331. By publicly repudiating the intervention-oriented policies of previous administra-
tions, Reagan appointees to the Antitrust Division and the FTC can be said to have
signalled to reviewing courts that the enforcement actions they did bring were designed to
stop unambiguously harmful conduct. Many court of appeals judges undoubtedly learn
of enforcement policy shifts through general news accounts, trade publications, academic
journals, speeches before professional associations, or social contact with enforcement
officials and practitioners who appear before the agencies in question. Announcing a
retrenchment of enforcement plans may be one way that an agency signals to reviewing
courts that it exercises its prosecutorial powers wisely and, consequently, its decisions to
prosecute are worthy of deference.
332. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
333. See DeSanti & Kovacic, supra note 102, at 610-11.
334. Cf. Fox, Chairman Miller, The Federal Trade Commission, Economics and
Rashomon, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs., No. 4, at 54-55 (1987) (comparing decisionmaking
approaches of FTC Chairmen Michael Pertschuk and James C. Miller I1).
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appointees have adhered to conservative antitrust preferences more fre-
quently than their Carter counterparts. However, the data also under-
score the significant extent to which conservative preferences have come
to influence antitrust decisionmaking by Carter appellate judges. The
conservatism of a substantial number of Carter appointees has yielded a
greater convergence of Carter and Reagan voting conduct than the con-
servative court-packing hypothesis would predict. This conservatism is
unremarkable when considered against the backdrop of modem Supreme
Court jurisprudence, academic scholarship, and change in the status of
the United States in the global economy.
The recent resignation of Justice Thurgood Marshall and the nomina-
tion of Judge Clarence Thomas to fill his seat on the Supreme Court have
provided an opportunity to consider how widely conservative antitrust
perspectives influence federal appellate judges today. Judge Thomas
wrote one antitrust opinion during his tenure on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc,335 Judge Thomas pointedly rejected the Justice De-
partment's argument that the defendant in a Clayton Act Section 7 hori-
zontal merger prosecution could rebut a prima facie case of illegality
"only by a clear showing that entry into the market by competitors
would be quick and effective." '336 While acknowledging that Supreme
Court decisions such as United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 
33 7
and United States v. Von's Grocery Co.338 had seemed to give decisive
effect to market share data alone, Judge Thomas emphasized that the
Court's later cases-particularly United States v. General Dynamics
Corp. 339-indicated that the introduction of evidence concerning post-
merger market concentration only begins the inquiry into a transaction's
likely competition impact:
General Dynamics began a line of decisions differing markedly in em-
phasis from the Court's antitrust cases of the 1960s. Instead of ac-
cepting a firm's market share as virtually conclusive proof of its market
power, the Court carefully analyzed defendants' rebuttal evidence.
These cases discarded Philadelphia Bank's insistence that a defendant
"clearly" disprove anticompetitive effect, and instead described the re-
buttal burden simply in terms of a "showing."
34
Judge Thomas recited the variety of paths that defendants can take to
rebut inferences based on market share data," and he noted that "[the
government hardly maximizes its scarce resources when it allows statis-
335. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
336. 908 F.2d at 983. Judge Thomas said "We find no merit in the legal standard
propounded by the government. It is devoid of support in the statute, in the case law,
and in the government's own Merger Guidelines." Id.
337. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
338. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
339. 415 U.S. 846 (1974).
340. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991 (footnote and citation omitted).
341. Id. at 985-86.
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tics alone to trigger its ponderous enforcement machinery." '342
As noted above,34 3 Baker Hughes adopts a restrictive view of Section 7
of the Clayton Act and its jurisprudence. If confirmed to the Supreme
Court, Judge Thomas would be a voice for disavowing the expansive en-
forcement possibilities articulated in the Court's merger decisions of the
1960s and for restating merger doctrine in a way that fully accounts for
defenses recognized in General Dynamics and its progeny. Such an ap-
proach assuredly reflects conservative antitrust values, but it would be a
mistake to conclude that the views of Judge Thomas are unique to Rea-
gan and Bush appointees to the federal appellate courts. The Reagan
and Bush Administrations accounted for two members of the unanimous
Baker Hughes panel (Judges Thomas and Sentelle), but the third partici-
pant was Ruth Ginsburg, a Carter appointee whose votes in non-immu-
nity antitrust matters have been as consistently conservative as any
Carter, Bush, or Reagan judge on the D.C. Circuit.3"
Nor would it be safe to assume that Judge Thomas will be dramati-
cally more conservative in deciding antitrust matters before the Court
than Justice Marshall. Regarded as one of the Court's most liberal mem-
bers, Justice Marshall occasionally authored opinions or cast votes that
established or reflected the liberal antitrust orthodoxy of the Warren
Era. 45 As Professor Victor Kramer has demonstrated, Justice Marshall
often voted to support the government's position in antitrust disputes,
including a significant number of merger cases. 46 Baker Hughes indi-
cates that Judge Thomas will be considerably less sympathetic to the
government's position in merger cases than Justice Marshall was.
At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that Judge Thomas will vote
more conservatively than Justice Marshall in placing obstacles in the
path of private antitrust plaintiffs. Scholars often point to the 1977 rul-
342. Id. at 992 n.13.
343. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
344. Judge Ginsburg cast votes in seven non-immunity antitrust cases during the sur-
vey period. She cast a single liberal vote in these matters. See FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636
F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In addition to her vote denying liability in Baker Hughes,
Judge Ginsburg cast conservative votes in Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 961 (1988); Rothery Storage & Van
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033
(1987); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 851 (1986); Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665
F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing
Judge Ginsburg's rejection of Justice Department challenge to merger of two drilling
equipment companies).
345. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 71 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,
545 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972) (majority opinion by Marshall, J.).
346. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 341, 350-53, 361-64.
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ing in Continental T V., Ina v. GTE Sylvania, Inc 7 as the watershed
event in the emergence of a more conservative Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence.' The attention lavished on Sylvania tends to over-
shadow the Court's decision in the same year in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,' 9 which has been at least as important as Syl-
vania in shaping outcomes in private antitrust litigation. Justice Mar-
shall's opinion for a unanimous Court in Brunswick established the
requirement that private plaintiffs prove "antitrust injury" to establish
their right to relief.350 In what proved to be a powerful symbolic and
substantive departure from the egalitarian antitrust jurisprudence of the
Warren era,35 1 Brunswick supplied the much-quoted observation that
"[tihe antitrust laws.., were enacted for the 'protection of competition,
not competitors.' ,,352 Not only did Justice Marshall vote in later cases to
extend Brunswick's application,353 but he also endorsed the strengthening
of evidentiary standards that plaintiffs must satisfy to establish antitrust
liability. 3 On the whole, the liberalism that Justice Marshall brought to
the resolution of civil liberties disputes did not extend to antitrust. If he
joins the Court it will take a potent mix of circumstance and effort for
Judge Thomas to author an opinion whose impact is more conservative
than Brunswick's.
The cases examined in this Article indicate that conservative antitrust
perspectives influence appellate decisionmaking well beyond the cham-
bers of Reagan and Bush appointees. The cases also show that one can-
not assume that Reagan and Bush judges automatically will resist pro-
enforcement theories or otherwise favor approaches that restrict the op-
eration of the antitrust laws. The Reagan-Bush judicial selection process
appears to have had the effect of screening out candidates with strong
preferences for expansive antitrust enforcement, but the process has
yielded a small but potentially significant subset of judges with moderate
or liberal instincts on matters such as distribution restraints. It is also
apparent that the conservatism of some Reagan-Bush judges takes the
form of an unwillingness to disregard much-criticized but still extant an-
347. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
348. See, eg., E.T. Sullivan & J. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic
Implications vii (1988) (identifying Sylvania as pivotal event of modem antitrust era).
349. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
350. 429 U.S. at 489.
351. See Kovacic IV, supra note 4, at 1426-27 & n.56.
352. Id. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 320; emphasis in
original). To practitioners who often represented antitrust plaintiffs, it soon became ap-
parent that Brunswick was a potent shield for defendants. See Susman, Standing in Pri-
vate Antitrust Cases" Where is the Supreme Court Going?, 52 Antitrust LJ. 465 (1983).
353. Justice Marshall voted with the majority in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petro-
leum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986).
354. Justice Marshall voted with the majority in Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elems.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Matsushita Ele. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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titrust precedents of the Warren Court or to give decisive effect to theo-
retically plausible economic defenses in the absence of a full factual
record. The Reagan-Bush court of appeals judges are more conservative
than their Carter colleagues on antitrust matters, but their conservatism
does not invariably entail rejection of moderate or liberal approaches to
antitrust analysis.
The aggregate statistical data on voting behavior obscure the signifi-
cance of Reagan-Bush judicial appointments in one other important re-
spect. President Reagan's appointees included individuals such as
Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas Ginsburg, Richard Posner,
and Ralph Winter, who came to the bench following academic careers
that featured extensive scholarship in the fields of antitrust and economic
regulation. Their small number belies their impact, as these judges have
used the opinion-writing process to imbue antitrust doctrine with con-
servative thinking. Drawing upon a substantial base of intellectual capi-
tal, the academics have exerted a disproportionate influence on the
direction of antitrust doctrine. So long as they remain on the bench,
these judges will play a formative role in framing the way in which other
federal judges analyze antitrust issues.
One lesson that emerges from the latter pattern is the importance pres-
idents might attach to the intellectual qualifications of their appointees.
It is one thing to appoint individuals who might be counted on to cast
conservative votes in cases before the courts of appeals. It is another to
choose judges whose learning and intellect provide an informing vision
about the appropriate path of the law and a strategy for pursuing that
path through the adjudication of individual cases. Academics constitute
the subset of potential nominees with the strongest incentives and oppor-
tunities to acquire this type of intellectual capital. Perhaps the shrewdest
and most influential element of President Reagan's judicial selection
strategy will prove to be his willingness to entrust the decision of appel-
late cases to academic scholars who have the intellectual capital to make
a preferred agenda of ideas take root in the law.
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